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ESSAYS ON RISKY HEALTH BEHAVIORS

by
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ABSTRACT

Risky health behaviors including substance abuse and risky sex are a significant
contributor to chronic illness in the US. Efficient use of public resources to avert or
mitigate the consequences of risky health behaviors requires a better understanding of the
overall costs of risky health behavior to society. Additionally, a better understanding of
the value and behavioral consequences of programs designed to mitigate the
consequences of risky health behavior is needed. This dissertation utilizes a number of
unique methodological and empirical tools to examine the consequences of risky sex and
drug abuse and the value of policies which seek to avert or mitigate the impact of the
consequences.
The first study uses a spatial difference-in-difference identification strategy to
estimate the impact of clandestine drug lab discovery and decontamination on proximal
home values. Results suggest that the discovery of a lab causes nearby home prices to
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drop significantly, while the decontamination of a lab causes nearby home prices to
increase significantly, partially offsetting the impact of discovery.
The second and third studies investigate the impacts of behavioral interventions
designed to reduce risky sexual behavior, including market and nonmarket costs. Overall
the results show that risky-sex behavioral interventions can generate substantial costsavings. Furthermore, the results show that interventions may affect the willingness to
pay to avoid the consequences of risky sexual behavior.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1

Risky Health Behaviors

Economic research of risky health behaviors has grown considerably in recent
years. Although prior to 1980, there were relatively few economic studies of risky health
behaviors, research has expanded considerably in the last few decades, both in terms of
theoretical and applied contributions (Cawley & Ruhm, 2011). Any deliberate action or
inaction which can potentially yield negative health consequences could be considered a
risky health behavior. However, the types of risky behaviors that are examined in this
dissertation are those which can also be characterized by a disconnect between
gratification and consequence. In spite of this disconnect, a number of studies have found
evidence that in the context of risky health behaviors, incentives still matter. For
example, Klick and Stratmann (2007) find that laws requiring parental consent for teens
to obtain abortions (thereby increasing the cost of risky sexual behavior) reduces risky
sexual activity. Similarly, Klick and Stratmann (2003) find that when access to abortion
increases (thereby decreasing the cost of risky sexual behavior) risky sexual activity
increased.
Given that incentives matter in the context of risky health behaviors, individual
preferences are also thought to contribute to risky health behaviors. The bulk of the work
in this area is focused on heterogeneity in time preferences, as well as the specification of
the proper discount function to explain risky health behaviors. For example, previous
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work has found that in numerous risky health behavior contexts, individuals’ exhibit time
preferences consistent with a hyperbolic discount function (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992),
suggesting that individuals preferences may not be time consistent.
A very important and understudied aspect of risky health behavior is information.
Decisions in this context can impose irreversible and severe consequences. Furthermore,
in the context of risky health behaviors, information can be rather complicated, as it
requires not only an awareness of the potential consequences associated with a behavior,
but also an understanding of how the behavior affects the likelihood of experiencing the
consequences. Awareness of consequences has been found to be an important
determinant of risky health behaviors (Lee, Chen, Liu, Hung, & Huang, 2010). Further
complicating matters is the role of addiction which is associated with a number of risky
health behaviors. For example, even if an individual is aware of the consequences of
smoking, and has an approximate understanding of how the choice to initiate smoking
today may affect future health outcomes, they may not understand their body’s
physiological response to the addictive substance. Even when individuals understand the
full extent of the consequences, they can overestimate their ability to overcome addiction
(Slovic, 2000, 2001). Thus, public policies which only address information are often only
partially effective (Loewenstein, Brennan, & Volpp, 2007).
Another contributing factor to the disconnect between gratification and
consequence of risky health behaviors is the existence of externalities. The individuals
who choose to engage in these behaviors often do not bear the full cost of their activities.
For example, cigarette smokers expose others to environmental tobacco smoke and fire
hazards (Chaloupka & Warner, 2000; Sloan, 2004). The external costs generated by
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excessive drinking include the costs experienced by victims of drunk driving accidents
and public expenditures associated with prosecution and incarceration of drunk drivers
(Greenfield et al., 2009; Levitt & Porter, 2001).
Public policy motivates much of the economic research of risky health behaviors.
Risky health behaviors have a large impact on morbidity and mortality in the US. Over
one-third of all deaths in the US can be attributed to modifiable behaviors such as
smoking, alcohol abuse, poor diet and risky sexual behavior (Schroeder, 2007). The
treatment of chronic illness attributable to risky health behaviors account for over 75% of
all health care costs (Fisher et al., 2011), and a significant portion of these treatment costs
are paid for with public spending. The externalities associated with risky health behaviors
also motivate a number of policy questions.
Well-informed policy in this context requires an understanding of all the
consequences associated with these behaviors and all of the impacts associated with
alternative policy options. This dissertation utilizes a number of unique methodological
and empirical tools in order to examine the consequences of risky sex and drug abuse and
the value of policies which seek to avert or mitigate the impact of these consequences.
The study presented in Chapter 2 is a revealed preference hedonic home price study
which investigates a consequence of drug abuse that has received little attention: the
impact of clandestine drug lab discovery and decontamination on proximal home values.
A stated preference contingent valuation study is conducted in Chapters 3 to examine the
nonmarket value of avoiding sexually transmitted infections, a consequence of risky
sexual behavior. The study presented in Chapter 4 also examines sexually transmitted
infections, but considers these costs from a societal perspective. Specifically, the study
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presented in Chapter 4 evaluates two distinct risky-sex behavioral interventions.
Although Chapters 2 and 3 focus on nonmarket values, the focus of Chapter 4 is
explicitly on market costs. This study illustrates the use of a Bernoulli probability model
linking observed changes in behavior to expected changes health outcomes, which are
monetized using treatment costs.
1.2

Methamphetamine Abuse, Risky Sex and Policy
Substance abuse in the US imposes a substantial economic burden in the US. The

estimated cost of illegal drugs exceeds $226 billion per year (Kasunic & Lee, 2014).
Recently, the rate of methamphetamine (meth) abuse in the US has been increasing
(Gruenewald et al., 2013). It is widely known that meth users suffer devastating health
effects. However, the impacts of meth are not limited to private costs experienced by the
user. In particular, meth users engage in more violent behaviors (Dawe, Davis, Lapworth,
& McKetin, 2009), and empirical evidence suggests that meth abuse can lead to increased
rates of child neglect and abuse (Cunningham & Finlay, 2013). Additionally, clandestine
meth labs have been known to cause adverse health effects for not only the drug
manufacturers, but also law enforcement officers, fire personnel, and residents living near
the clandestine labs (Ross & Sternquist, 2012). Meth labs also pose an environmental
health risk, as one pound of meth yields five to six pounds of hazardous waste which is
often dumped in the surrounding neighborhood (Joint Federal Task Force of the Drug
Enforcement Administration, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, & U.S. Coast
Guard, 2005).
Policy interventions which address meth labs have focused on prevention, rather
than remediation (Bobo, 2013). Recent policies, such as the Combat Methamphetamine
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Epidemic Acts of 2005 have restricted producers’ access to meth precursor chemicals,
significantly reducing the incidence of meth lab discoveries, as well as the scale of labs in
the US (Shukla, Crump, & Chrisco, 2012). However, an important issue facing
policymakers is how to manage properties where meth labs have already been
discovered. Numerous media outlets have reported negative effects for individuals
moving into homes that were unknown to be contaminated with meth by the previous
occupants. And while meth labs have surfaced in every state in the US, only half have
enacted legislation which mandates lab decontamination. One of the most vocal
arguments against mandatory remediation is that the cost of decontamination falls on the
homeowners, which may not have had any involvement in the production of meth. Many
meth labs are discovered on rental properties.
Risky sexual behavior imposes a considerable burden on the healthcare system.
One-third of all Americans will contract a Sexually Transmitted Infection (STI) at some
point in their lives (Summers, Kates, & Murphy, 2002) and the lifetime treatment costs
resulting from a single year of STIs in the US exceeds $15.6 billion. Marginalized
groups, such as justice-involved youth and men who have sex with men (MSM) are at
particularly high risk for STIs, as both groups contract a disproportionately large number
of new infections (CDC, 2015; H. W. Chesson, J. M. Blandford, T. L. Gift, G. Y. Tao, &
K. L. Irwin, 2004). One approach to reducing STI incidence are behavioral interventions
designed to reduce risky sexual behaviors. However, the implementation of these
programs often requires public resources. While efficacy of a particular program is
important to public health planners, they also need to understand how these programs
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benefit the individuals for whom the program is implemented, as well as the social
benefits.

1.3

Contributions of this Dissertation
This dissertation uses a variety of methods to evaluate the consequences of risky

health behaviors. Chapter 2 uses the hedonic home price method to investigate
externalities associated with meth production in residential neighborhoods. The study
presented in Chapter 3 uses a contingent valuation survey to estimate the nonmarket
value of STI avoidance as well as the impact of a behavioral intervention on willingness
to pay. The study presented in Chapter 4 also examines the consequences of risky sexual
behavior. However, the study presented in Chapter 4 utilizes a deterministic model which
links changes in behavior to changes in expected health outcomes in order to monetize
the impacts of behavioral interventions designed to reduce risky sexual behavior.
The analysis presented in Chapter 2 examines how meth labs located in residential
neighborhoods affect the property values of nearby homes. This study uses a novel
dataset constructed from geo-coded meth lab and property sale data in Linn County,
Oregon. To determine the impact of clandestine meth lab discovery and decontamination
on proximal home values, a hedonic home price study is conducted using a quasiexperimental, difference-in-difference, spatial identification strategy. This is the first
study to consider the positive impacts of meth lab decontamination alongside the negative
impacts of meth lab discovery. Thus, the findings presented in Chapter 2 could provide
insight into the value of policies related to both prevention and mitigation of clandestine
drug labs.
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The study presented in Chapter 3 examines the nonmarket value of STI avoidance
using a contingent valuation survey. The contingent valuation survey data presented in
Chapter 3 were obtained during the clinical trial of a risky sex behavioral intervention
designed for justice-involved youth. Although the use of contingent valuation in health
economics has expanded considerably in recent years, there is, relatively, a dearth of
work applying contingent valuation in the context of STIs. Furthermore, while a handful
of studies have utilized contingent valuation methods in the context of STIs, this is the
first to investigate how a risky-sex behavioral intervention may affect the willingness-topay to avoid the consequences associated with risky sexual behavior. Specifically,
willingness to pay is elicited before and after the behavioral intervention, which allows
for the impact of the intervention on the perceived value of STI avoidance to be tested.
Chapter 4 presents another study of the consequences of risky sexual behavior.
However, the focus of Chapter 4 is on quantifying the impacts of two distinct behavioral
interventions designed to reduce risky-sex behaviors. The efficacy of both of these
behavioral interventions have been verified in previous work (Kurtz, Stall, Buttram,
Surratt, & Chen, 2013). However, while clinical efficacy in this context is based on how
the intervention affects behavior, the economic impacts are determined by health
outcomes. As health outcomes were not observed during the clinical trials for these
behavioral interventions, behavioral data, collected at multiple nodes during the clinical
trials of these interventions is used to predict changes in health outcomes. The data used
in Chapter 4 were obtained during the clinical trial of two distinct risky-sex behavioral
interventions designed specifically for substance-using men who have sex with men.
Chapter 4 illustrates the use of a Bernoulli probability model to translate changes in risky
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sexual behaviors attributable to a behavioral intervention, into changes in health
outcomes. This study is unique in the level of detail regarding risky sexual behavior. In
particular, while the Bernoulli model used in this study is based on previous work, it is
adapted in order to incorporate the risks associated with numerous sexual acts, which
correspond to widely varying levels of STI transmission rates and prevalence.
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Chapter 2: The Impact of Clandestine Methamphetamine Lab Discovery and
Decontamination on Property Values

2.1

Introduction

Substance abuse imposes a substantial economic burden in the United States
(US), where it is estimated that the cost of illegal drug abuse exceeds $226 billion per
year (Kasunic & Lee, 2014). While a number of studies have investigated the economic
burden of substance use disorders, there is still a number of aspects about these social
costs that are not well-understood. For instance, it is common for economic studies of
substance use disorders to focus on three outcome domains (increased health care costs,
crime and lost productivity), when the true cost of substance use extends to a number of
areas that are still relatively unexplored. Notably, there are relatively few examples of
previous work evaluating the impact of illicit drug production on property values. This
study evaluates the impact of illicit drug production on property values in a particularity
relevant domain: the impact of clandestine methamphetamine (meth) labs on proximal
residential property values.
For background on methamphetamine (meth), it is a particularly devastating and
cheap drug, with a relatively long half-life (Shoptaw & Reback, 2007), and use in the US
has increased substantially in recent years (Gruenewald et al., 2013). While causality is
actively debated (Mialon, Nesson, & Samuel, 2014), individuals under the influence of
meth commonly engage in higher rates of risky sexual behavior (Purcell et al., 2005) and
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violent behavior (Dawe et al., 2009). Also, meth use has been found to be associated with
child neglect, child abuse, and an increased burden on the foster care system
(Cunningham & Finlay, 2013).
It is estimated that in the US, the annual societal burden of meth is nearly $23.4
billion (Nicosia, Pacula, Kilmer, Lundberg, & Chiesa, 2009). Beyond the standard cost
estimates, clandestine meth laboratories (labs) are often located in residential
neighborhoods, and can pose health risks and potential damage to the personal property
of individuals living in nearby homes. Recent policies at both the state and the federal
level have helped to curb the incidence of domestic residential meth production.1 But,
supplemented by foreign production, the meth supply chain has continued to meet
demand and domestic meth consumption continues to be a substantial problem.
An important issue facing policy makers is how to manage properties where meth
labs have already been discovered. Meth becomes airborne during the cooking process,
and contaminates the surfaces of homes (counters, walls, carpets, air ducts, etc.).
Additionally, meth production poses an environmental risk. One pound of meth yields
five to six pounds of hazardous waste, which is often dumped in the surrounding area
(Joint Federal Task Force of the Drug Enforcement Administration et al., 2005). Between
2004 and 2012, over 118,000 clandestine meth labs were discovered in the US, and while

At the federal level, the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act (CMEA) of 2005
considerably restricted access to methamphetamine precursors (see, e.g., Combat
Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §§ 701-756, 120 Stat.
256 (2006)). Prior to, and following the passage of the CMEA individual states have
enacted more stringent controls on meth precursors. In 2006, Oregon adopted legislation
requiring individuals to obtain a prescription in order to purchase medications which
contain meth precursors (P. R. Freeman & Talbert, 2012).
1
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labs have been discovered in every state in the US, less than half have adopted legislation
requiring decontamination (Bobo, 2013).
To help expand our understanding of the full impacts of drug abuse, the objective
of this study is to explore the impact of illicit drug production on property values.
Specifically, we evaluate the impact of clandestine meth labs on proximal residential
property values in Linn County, Oregon. This county is an ideal location for this study
because of its unique combination of high quality data on both meth labs and property
values and its historical high incidence of meth-related events. Empirically, the impact of
meth lab discovery and meth lab decontamination on nearby home prices is investigated
using a quasi-experimental, difference-in-difference, spatial identification strategy, which
mitigates the natural endogeneity that occurs when empirically investigating the
relationship between crime and property values (Congdon-Hohman, 2013; Linden &
Rockoff, 2008; Pope, 2008). Results suggest that when a meth lab is discovered, it
‘Breaks Bad’ for the entire neighborhood, even when accounting for the fact that meth
labs are generally located in less-desirable neighborhoods with lower home prices.
Additionally, although home prices recover following the decontamination of the meth
lab, the recovery does not entirely offset the impact of discovery.
The next section provides background on clandestine meth labs and the policies
used to decrease the incidence; Section 2.3 discusses the empirical approach; Section 2.4
describes the study area and data; Section 2.5 presents the results, including numerous
auxiliary models included to test for the robustness of the empirical results; and, finally,
Section 2.6 discusses and concludes the study.
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2.2

Clandestine Methamphetamine Laboratories

Numerous state and federal government policies have been put in place to disrupt
the supply of meth. Many of these policies have involved placing restrictions upon access
to precursor chemicals used to produce meth (e.g., ephedrine and pseudoephedrine).
Unfortunately, meth can be produced using numerous processes and various precursor
chemicals. As a result, the meth supply chain has been able to recover quickly from these
shocks. Moreover, in the notable instances where policies have been able to significantly
disrupt the supply of meth (in terms of both price and purity), the market has been able to
adapt and recover quickly (Dobkin & Nicosia, 2009). Additionally, as domestic meth
producers are increasingly subject to the stringent regulations on precursor chemicals,
larger quantities of meth are being imported from Mexico (Brouwer et al., 2006).
Recently, perhaps due to increased regulation, domestic meth labs have become smaller
and more urban, which has caused them to potentially be more dangerous.
While the low-probability threats associated with meth production (e.g., chemical
fires, explosions, and the release of toxic gasses) are commonly known, less well-known
are the systemic negative health impacts and environmental pollution generated by meth
production. For instance, numerous media outlets have reported negative effects
experienced by individuals moving into homes that were not known to be contaminated
with meth by the previous occupants.2 Moreover, meth production has been known to
cause adverse health effects for drug manufacturers, law enforcement officers, fire and
police personnel and residents living near laboratory sites (Nicosia et al., 2009).

2

An interested reader should refer to (Dewan & Brown, 2009).
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However, while clandestine meth labs have appeared in every state in the US, less than
half of the states have recognized the need to decontaminate homes where meth has been
produced.
An example of a state which has adopted mandatory cleanup legislation is State of
Oregon. In 1990, the Oregon Health Authority’s (OHA) Clandestine Drug Lab Program
(CDLP) was created and tasked with administering the decontamination and cleanup of
meth (and other clandestine drug) labs discovered in the state. When a suspected lab is
reported, contractors licensed by the CDLP inspect the property for contamination. To be
re-occupied, any homes found to be contaminated must submit a cleanup work plan that
needs to be approved by the CDLP. Once approved, the cleanup can be performed, and
only then can the site must be re-inspected and issued a certificate of fitness from the
CDLP.3 All State and Local agencies that suspect a property has been used in the illicit
manufacture of drugs must be reported to the CDLP and undergo an inspection.
Furthermore, homeowners are legally required to report their property for inspection if
there are “reasonable grounds to believe that the property has been used as an illegal drug
manufacturing site” ("Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 453.861," 1989).

2.3

Theoretical Approach
Hedonic home price studies use observations of behavior within the housing

market in order to infer consumers’ willingness-to-pay for a non-market amenity (or

3

More detail on lab cleanup procedures can be obtained from Oregon Department of
Human Services (2015).
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disamenity). The theoretical basis for hedonic valuation is based on the work of Rosen
(1974), who outlined a model of consumer behavior to describe the market for
differentiated goods. The basic theory of hedonic markets assumes that consumers derive
utility from the consumption of a specific heterogeneous good represented by a vector Z
of characteristics, along with a composite good Y priced at unity. Household preferences
are represented by the utility function
u  u Y , Z 

(2.1)

The budget constraint, M is constant in any period and is represented as
M  Y  PZ 

(2.2)

where P  Z  represents the hedonic price function. Utility is maximized with respect to
home characteristics and consumption of the composite good.
max u Y , Z  subject to P  Z   Y  M
Z ,Y

(2.3)

Consumption of the composite good is replaced by Y  M  P  Z  , which yields the first
order conditions

uz  M  P  Z  , Z 

uY  M  P  Z  , Z 

 Pz  Z 

(2.4)

The slope of the hedonic price function is equal to the marginal rate of substitution
between the attribute and the numeraire good. A buyer’s maximum bid for a house is
described by the bid function,   Z ; u , M  which holds utility and income fixed. The bid
function represents what a consumer would pay for alternative attribute vectors at given
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levels of utility and income. Consumption of the composite good can be replaced by
Y  M    Z  . Utility maximization yields the first order conditions,

uz  M    Z  , Z 

uY  M    Z  , Z 

 Z  Z 

(2.5)

The slope of the bid function are also equal to the marginal rate of substitution, which
suggests that in equilibrium, the bid function is tangent to the hedonic price function.
This result justifies the use of hedonic models to study consumer welfare. In equilibrium,
consumers’ willingness-to-pay is equal to the observed hedonic price function.
In practice, the vector of attributes which define a home Z is broken down into
numerous categories of vectors, including structural  S  , neighborhood  N  attributes,
and spatial and temporal location in relation to meth labs,  Q  . Consumers choose the
utility-maximizing home from available homes, subject to their budget constraint.
Assuming that the housing market is in equilibrium, the price of the ith home  Pi  will
be determined by the hedonic price function,
Pi  P  Si , N i , Qi 

(2.6)

The partial derivative of the hedonic price function with respect to the characteristic or
attribute of interest is the marginal implicit price for that attribute (Freeman III, 1995).
Hedonic price theory has been used to estimate a number of nonmarket housing
attributes. Historically, hedonic home price studies have focused on environmental
amenities and dis-amenities, including air quality (Graves, Murdoch, Thayer, &
Waldman, 1988), proximity to landfills (Hite, Chern, Hitzhusen, & Randall, 2001), and
noise (McMillan, Reid, & Gillen, 1980). A number of studies have considered dis-
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amenities which are accompanied by uncertain health effects. Davis (2004) considered
the effect of cancer clusters on home prices, finding that a sudden spike in pediatric
leukemia can have a significant negative impact on nearby home prices. GamperRabindran and Timmins (2013) estimated the impact of Superfund remediation on home
prices, finding highly localized, but significant positive impact of remediation on home
prices.
Another research avenue is the impact of crime on home prices. Linden and
Rockoff (2008), as well as Pope (2008) considered the impact of sex offender proximity
on home prices. Both studies find significant negative impacts on home prices after a sex
offender moves into the neighborhood. Pope (2008) incorporated a treatment-reversal
into his estimates, and found that when the offender moved out of the neighborhood,
home prices recovered significantly. Troy and Grove (2008) consider the relationship
between what is generally regarded a positive neighborhood attribute (parks) and crime.
Troy and Grove (2008) find that parks have a positive impact on home prices until crime
rates exceed a certain threshold, at which time the park becomes more of a nuisance. Tita,
Petras, and Greenbaum (2006) examine the more general impact of neighborhood crime
rates, finding heterogeneous impacts based on neighborhood affluence and the rates of
specific crimes. Beyond studies of home prices, hedonic price theory is used to estimate
characteristics of a variety of differentiated goods, including tomatoes (Jordan, Shewfelt,
Prussia, & Hurst, 1985), cotton fiber (Ethridge, 1992), hotel rooms (Tung, Lai, & Huang,
2012), rice (Goodwin, Holcomb, & Rister, 1996), and hay (Rudstrom, 2004).

2.4

Empirical Approach
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2.4.1

Identification Strategy

Although the theoretical basis of the hedonic method is relatively straightforward, estimation of the hedonic price function can often be challenging due to
concerns regarding omitted variable bias. A concern relevant to the current study is meth
producers’ choices regarding lab location, which could be correlated with unobserved
neighborhood qualities that are also correlated with price. Furthermore, controlling for
initial differences between neighborhoods is insufficient if unobserved factors affecting
meth producers’ location choices are also a determinate of existing trends in house prices.
In order to mitigate the effect of potential cross-sectional and time-series endogeneity,
this study adopts a quasi-experimental strategy to identify the hedonic price function
(Black, 1999; Chay & Greenstone, 1998; Linden & Rockoff, 2008).
The potential selection bias introduced by non-random meth lab location patterns
is controlled for using a spatial difference-in-difference model where the treatment and
control group assignment is determined by proximity to the lab. Specifically, consistent
with previous studies, homes located within 0.1 miles of a meth lab are assigned to the
treatment group, while homes between 0.1 and 0.3 miles from the lab are assigned to the
control group (the specific choice of distance for the control and the treatment group is
evaluated in the robustness section). The idea behind this identification strategy is that
while meth house location choices may be endogenous and related to unobserved
neighborhood factors, these omitted variables are correlated with proximity. Thus, a
quasi-control group can be constructed using houses that are in close proximity to houses
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affected by the meth lab. A visual depiction of the identification strategy is provided in
Figure 2-1.

2.4.2

Pre-Discovery Difference Model

First, before we test the impact of meth labs on property values, the endogenous
nature of meth house locations is tested by estimating whether home prices in
neighborhoods where labs are eventually discovered differ from the prices in
neighborhoods where meth labs are not discovered. This relationship is tested by
estimating a pre-discovery difference model, where homes in the treatment and control
group (i.e., homes within 0.3 miles of a lab) are excluded from the estimation if the sale
took place after the discovery of the lab. This model is specified as follows:
ln  Pijt    X i  1Dijt0.1   2 Dijt0.3    j  t   ijt

(2.7)

where ln  Pijt  is the natural log of house i's inflation-adjusted sale price, and the vector

Xi includes the structural  S i  and neighborhood  N i  characteristics specific to the
house. The subscripts i , j and t refer to individual, census block and time components
of the model respectively. The homes in the treatment group are indicated by the binary
variable Dijt0.1 , which is equal to one if the home is within 0.1 miles of where a lab will
eventually be discovered, (otherwise zero). The binary variable, Dijt0.3 indicates
membership in the control group, where Dijt0.3 is equal to one if the home is located within
0.3 miles from where a lab will eventually be discovered, otherwise zero. Finally,  ijt is a
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random error term, (including census-block and time fixed effects) and ,  , 1 and 2
are parameters to be estimated.
In this initial specification, because homes within 0.3 miles of a lab are excluded
if they were sold after the lab was discovered, this model estimates the preexisting
difference in home prices for the neighborhoods where meth labs do eventually locate. If
meth labs locate entirely at random (i.e., no endogenous location choices), then the
estimated coefficient on the binary control group variable would be equal to zero

 H 10 :  2  0  . Alternatively, if the location of meth labs is not random, and is actually
influenced by pre-existing differences in property values, the estimated coefficient on the
binary control group variable would not be equal to zero  H 1a :  2  0  . Additionally, if
there are not pre-existing differences between homes within 0.1 miles and homes
between 0.1 and 0.3 miles of a meth house, the estimated coefficient on the binary
treatment group variable would be equal to zero  H 2 0 : 1  0  . Otherwise, if these areas
are not comparable we would find that the estimated coefficient on the binary treatment
group variable would not be equal to zero  H 2a : 1  0  . Overall, it is expected that

2  0 and that 1  0 , indicating that meth labs generally locate in neighborhoods with
lower property values, but that there are no pre-existing differences between the prices of
our treatment and control groups.

2.4.3

Lab-Discovery Difference-in-Difference Model

20
Because we expect to find that meth producers do in fact choose lab locations
based on unobservable factors correlated with proximity, the following difference-indifference model is specified to estimate the actual impact of lab discovery:
ln  Pijt    X i  1Dijt0.1  2 Dijt0.3   3 Dijt0.1  4 Dijt0.3  itdisc   j  t   ijt

(2.8)

This specification is similar to Eq. 2.2, except the full dataset is used and a binary
disc
variable  it is included, which is equal to one if the property sale occurs after the lab is

discovered, otherwise zero. Thus, in this difference-in-difference specification, the
coefficients 1 and 2 will capture pre-existing home price differences in the treatment
and control groups, and 4 will capture time trends associated with being in an area
where meth houses locate, allowing 3 to capture the impact of lab discovery on
proximal home prices. If the differences in home prices around meth labs are due solely
to pre-existing differences in home prices, the lab discovery should have no impact on
home prices  H 30 :  3  0  . Alternatively, if the discovery of the lab does affect the
prices of homes in surrounding areas, then the estimated coefficient on the interaction
between the binary distance variables and the timing variables would not be equal to zero

 H 3a :  3  0  .

2.4.4

Lab Discovery and Lab-Decontamination Difference-in-Difference Model

In addition to allowing for the estimation of the impact of meth lab discovery, a
novel feature of the OHA CDLP dataset is that it contains information on the timing of
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meth lab decontamination. This information is included in the empirical model, using the
following difference-in-difference model
ln  Pijt    X i  1Dijt0.1   2 Dijt0.3    3 Dijt0.1   4 Dijt0.3  itdisc 

5 Dijt0.1  6 Dijt0.3  itclean   j  t   ijt

(2.9)

clean
where the binary variable,  it is equal to one if the home is sold after the discovered

meth lab has been decontaminated, otherwise zero. If lab decontamination did not have
an impact on home prices the estimated coefficient on the interaction between the binary
treatment group variable and lab decontamination timing variable would be equal to zero

 H 4 0 :  5  0  . Alternatively, if the decontamination of the lab has an impact on the sale
price of the home, then this would not be equal to zero  H 4 a :  5  0  .

2.4.5

Auxiliary Models

A number of auxiliary models are specified to determine the robustness of the
primary model results. First, the binary distance variables specifications in the primary
model reflect the choices of a previous study (Linden & Rockoff, 2008) examining the
impact of sex-offenders moving into a neighborhood. However, Linden and Rockoff
(2008) choice of 0.1 and 0.3 were justified by statute: all the households within 0.3 miles
of the sex-offender’s new home had to be notified when the offender moved in. There is
no equivalent notification statute regarding meth labs. In order to determine whether the
impact of the choice of distance for the treatment and control groups is
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ln  Pijt    X i  1DijtTreatment   2 DijtControl   3 DijtTreatment   4 DijtControl  itdisc 

 D
5

Treatment
ijt

  6 DijtControl  itclean   j  t   ijt

(2.10)

where the distance cutoff for the binary variable, DijtTreatment varies between 0.1 and 0.2
miles, and the distance cutoff for the binary variable, DijtControl varies between 0.2 and 0.5
miles.
The next auxiliary model is motivated by variable coding. In particular, the timing
and distance binary variables in the primary model are overlapping. For example, if a
home is within 1 tenth of a mile to a lab,  D 0.1  1 , then  D0.3  1 . Alternatively, the
variables could be coded such that they are exclusive. The econometric specification is
identical, however the interpretation of the coefficients on the variables is slightly
different. Similar to Eq. 2.8, a lab discovery model is specified as
ln  Pijt    X i   1Dijt0.1  2 Dijt0.3    3 Dijt0.1  4 Dijt0.3  itdisc   j  t   ijt (2.11)

However, while the coefficient, 1 in Eq. 2.8 refers to the marginal effect of living within
0.1 miles of a meth lab, regardless of timing, the coefficient  1 in Eq. 2.11 is the
marginal effect of living within 0.1 miles of a lab, prior to the discovery of the lab.
Similarly, 2 is the marginal effect of living between 0.1 and 0.3 miles of a meth lab,
prior to the discovery of the lab. The coefficients 3 and 4 capture the marginal effect
of living within 0.1 miles or between 0.1 and 0.3 miles, after the discovery of the lab,
respectively. Next, a lab decontamination model is specified similar to Eq. 2.9
ln  Pijt    X i   1Dijt0.1   2 Dijt0.3    3 Dijt0.1   4 Dijt0.3  itdisc
  5 Dijt0.1   6 Dijt0.3  itclean   j  t   ijt

(2.12)
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Similar to Eq. 2.11, all distance and timing variables are specified exclusively. In this
specification, the coefficient 3 represents the marginal effect on price for homes within
0.1 miles, after the discovery of the lab, but before decontamination. Similarly, the
coefficient 4 represents the marginal effect on price for homes between 0.1 and 0.3
miles, after the discovery of the lab, but before decontamination. The coefficients 5 and

6 represent the marginal effect on price for homes within 0.1 miles and between 0.1 and
0.3 miles, following decontamination. Similar to the primary models, the econometric
models specified in Eq. 2.11 and Eq. 2.12 are estimated using the complete data set, as
well as a restricted set which excludes home sales more than 0.3 miles from a lab.
The next auxiliary specification is motivated by the potential confounding
relationship between time since the lab was discovered and lab decontamination. All lab
decontamination takes place after the discovery of the lab. Time between discovery and
decontamination can vary significantly. Thus, lab decontamination could be a proxy for
time-since-discovery. To explore this possibility, the lab discovery variable is broken
down into seven separate time-since-discovery variables (from 0-6 months to 36+ months
in 6-month increments).
ln  Pijt    X i  1Dijt0.1   2 Dijt0.3    3 Dijt0.1   4 Dijt0.3  itdisc 0-6
  5 Dijt0.1   6 Dijt0.3  itdisc 6-12   7 Dijt0.1  8 Dijt0.3  itdisc 12-18
  9 Dijt0.1  10 Dijt0.3  itdisc 18-24  11Dijt0.1  12 Dijt0.3  itdisc 24-30
 13 Dijt0.1  14 Dijt0.3  itdisc 36+  15 Dijt0.1  16 Dijt0.3  itclean
 j  t   ijt

(2.13)
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The final auxiliary model is used to estimate the impact of linear distance
following the discovery of the lab. Rather than a number of binary distance and timing
variables, this model includes a single continuous distance variable, specified as
ln  Pijt    X i   Dijt   j  t   ijt

(2.14)

For this model, only homes within 0.3 miles of a lab which has been discovered are
included. The coefficient  captures the marginal effect of distance from a discovered
lab.

2.5

Study Area and Data

2.5.1

Study Area

To evaluate the impact of meth houses on property values this study uses data
from Linn County, Oregon. As discussed in Section 2, Oregon requires homes suspected
of being used for drug manufacturing to be reported to the CDLP, which administers the
decontamination process. Meth lab data was acquired through a data-sharing agreement
with the OHA’s CDLP, which includes the site of the lab, the date of the lab discovery,
and the date the lab was decontaminated. Note that the meth lab data utilized in this study
is much more comprehensive than other potential data sources that rely on the voluntary
reporting of local agencies (e.g., the DEA’s clandestine drug lab registry). For instance,
in analysis of Linn County the full CDLP dataset includes 133 clandestine labs, whereas
the DEA clandestine drug lab registry includes only 24 (Drug Enforcement
Administration, 2015). Additionally, Linn County is particularly well-suited because of
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the availability of high quality, detailed home sale data. While detailed property sale data
is often difficult to obtain (and nearly impossible in some states, depending on the
disclosure laws), the Linn County Assessor’s Office makes this data easily accessible
online (Linn County Assessor's Office).
Beyond the unique combination of readily available home sale and meth lab data,
Linn County is also an ideal study candidate because of its geography, demographics and
incidence of drug-related events. Linn County straddles Interstate-5 (which is a major
route for drug trafficking in the Western US).4 Most of the area is within an hour’s drive
from the urban population center of Portland, OR. Additionally, Linn County is
comprised primarily of three cities with varying population levels and demographics.
Figure 2-2 displays meth labs that were discovered in Linn County. The meth lab
observations in Linn County are clustered around the three largest cities: Albany,
Lebanon and Sweet Home. Additionally, the locations of home sales in Linn County can
be seen in Figure 2-3. Similar to the locations of meth labs, home sale observations are
clustered in the County’s three largest cities. Note that the rural portions of Linn County
(with few or no home sales) are primarily comprised of farmland and timberland. Also,
previous work utilizing spatial and temporal scan statistics have found significant
clustering of meth-related incidents in Linn County (Sudakin & Power, 2009).
Overall, this study utilizes property sale data collected from 1999 to 2013 and
meth house data collected from 1996 to 2013. The addresses of both meth labs and
property sales were geocoded using the ArcGIS database. Once the addresses were

4

A majority of the meth labs in the CDLP data set are clustered within 20 miles of
Interstate-5.
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geocoded, the geodetic distance between each meth lab and each property was
calculated.5 The raw dataset contains 133 discovered labs and 29,951 property sale
observations. After excluding observations with missing data, the meth lab dataset
includes 99 discovered labs. After excluding observations with missing data, and limiting
the property sale to residentially zoned houses and homes within Linn County’s 15
incorporated cities, the property sale dataset includes 18,819 observations.

2.5.2

Data

The Linn County home sale data is quite detailed, and allow for the empirical
models to control for numerous structural  S i  and neighborhood characteristics  N i  .
The structural characteristics include: the area of the housing structure  SQUAREFT  ,
specified in thousands of square feet; the number of bedrooms  BEDROOMS  ; the
number of bathrooms  BATHS  ; the home appraisal score (between 0 and 100),

 SCORE  ; the size of the lot  ACRES  ; age, specified as a log-transformed variable

 ln  AGE   ; a binary variable which accounts for whether the dwelling is a manufactured
home  MANUFACTURED  ; and, a binary variable indicating whether the home is
located within a quarter-mile of a school  SCHOOL  . Additionally, binary variables

5

Geodetic distance is calculated as the length of the shortest curve between points along
the surface of a mathematical model of the earth. Source: ArcGIS Resources
(resources.arcgis.com)
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were included to account for systematic differences between each of Linn County’s 15
incorporated cities  CITY  .
The data also includes the names of the buyers and sellers, from which a number
of binary variables were created. Specifically, these variables include whether the buyer
purchased three or more homes during the observation period  ACTIVEBUYER  and
whether the seller sold three or more homes during the observation period

 ACTIVESELLER  . These variables represent an attempt to control for buyer and seller
experience in the local housing market. Additionally, binary variables indicating whether
the buyer was a federal government agency  FEDBUYER  and whether the seller was a
federal government agency  FEDSELLER  . These variables are included in order to
account for participation of federal government agencies in the housing market, which
varied significantly during the period of observation, and peaked during the most recent
recession.6

2.6

Results

2.6.1

Graphical Evidence

6

When the federal government is found to be a participant in a housing transaction, the
agency involved was generally the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie
Mae”).
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Figure 2-4 presents the house price gradients for the treatment and control groups
both before and after the meth house was discovered.7 Note that prior to the discovery of
the lab, the price of homes in the treatment and control group generally track together and
following the discovery of the lab (graphically, at day 0), a clear structural change is
observed. Furthermore, the drop in treatment group home prices persists even two years
after the meth lab was discovered.

2.6.2

Summary Statistics

Summary statistics are presented in Table 2.1. Of the 29,951 property sale
observations in the raw dataset, approximately 11,132 observations are excluded.
Observations are excluded if data is missing, or if the property did not have at least one
bathroom and one bedroom. Additionally, observations are excluded if the property
zoning is not residential, or if the property is not located within the boundaries of one of
Linn County’s 15 incorporated cities. The remaining 18,819 observations include 1,806
properties which were located within 0.1 miles of a lab and 8,025 properties which were
located within 0.3 miles. There are some differences between all homes and homes
within 0.3 miles of discovered meth houses. Notably, homes within 0.3 miles of a meth
house have smaller acreage and are older. Alternatively, is little difference between
homes within 0.1 miles of a meth house and homes within 0.3 miles of a meth lab.

7

The graph in Figure 2-4 is generated by a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression
of price on days relative to discovery
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2.6.3

Empirical Results

Table 2.2 presents this study’s main empirical results. The first column of Table
2.2 presents the results from the pre-discovery model (specified in Eq. 2.2). Recall that
this model tests for endogeneity in meth lab location patterns by limiting the sample to
home sales prior to the discovery of the lab. Overall, homes located within 0.3 miles of
where a meth lab will eventually be discovered sell for substantially less (-15.13%) than
homes further away. This finding suggests potential endogeneity in the patterns of meth
lab discoveries (consistent with rejecting H10 in favor of H1a ). It is also interesting to
note that homes within 0.1 miles from an eventual lab discovery did not sell at an
additional discount, which suggests similarity in pricing for the treatment and control
groups (consistent with failure to reject H 20 ).
Columns 2-4 present the results of the models estimated using the full sample, and
are used to test the impact of both meth house discovery and meth house cleanup on
property values. Specifically, column 2 is a cross-sectional difference model, which
includes housing characteristics and year and census-block fixed effects (analogous to
Eq. 2.2, only estimated with the full sample), column 3 is the spatial difference-indifference model specified in Eq. 2.3, and column 4 is the spatial difference-in-difference
model, including cleanup dummies (which corresponds to Eq. 2.4). Note that all three of
these models additionally include the housing characteristics and census-block fixed
effects.
In terms of results it is again clear that meth houses locate in areas with lower
0.3
property values as the coefficient on D is significant in each model. However, when
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housing characteristics, census-block fixed effects, and timing of lab discovery are
included, the magnitude of this effect diminishes (from 4.59% to 2.76%). In terms of the
impact of meth houses on proximal property values, the timing of the meth house
discovery and decontamination relative to the property sale has a significant impact. This
result is highlighted in the model specification which accounts for the timing of both
discovery and decontamination (column 4), where the discovery of a meth lab reduces
home values by 6.2% and the decontamination of a discovered meth lab generates a
significant 4.71% positive impact (both significant beyond the 1% level), but does not
completely offset the impact of lab discovery (consistent with rejecting H30 and H 40 in
favor of their respective alternative hypotheses). Additionally, our results highlight the
importance of including regional proximity control trends. In both column 3 and column
4, the parameter for D0.3 * disc is significant and negative (approximately -2.76% for
both), indicating that locations proximal to meth labs change in value at different rates
than other homes.
Due to the fact that these models utilize property sale observations outside of the
treatment and control group, it is worthwhile to test for potential differences in the way
that the characteristics of homes outside of the treatment and control group are valued. To
do this, models analogous to Eq. 2.3 and Eq. 2.4 are estimated that exclude observations
more than 0.3 miles from a lab. The results from these specifications using limited data
are presented in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.2. In column 5, none of the coefficients on
the binary variables accounting for distance or timing of lab discovery are statistically
significant. However, when decontamination is accounted for, (column 6) the sale price
of homes located within 0.1 miles decline by approximately 5.35% (significant beyond
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the 1% level). Additionally, the prices of homes within the treatment group recover by
approximately 3.9% following cleanup (significant at the 5% level).
Finally, column 7 of Table 2.2 presents a model similar to column, but where the
standard errors are clustered at the lab area level. In this model, the standard errors are
clustered based on the first lab to be discovered within 0.3 miles of the home.

2.6.4

Marginal Implicit Price of Home Attributes

The marginal implicit price for select structural attributes are provided in Table
2.3. The variable controlling for home age is log-transformed. Thus, marginal implicit
price is calculated by multiplying the average home price by the coefficient on ln  AGE 
and dividing by the attribute’s sample average. The remaining attributes are not logtransformed, so the marginal implicit price is found by multiplying the sample average of
price by the coefficient on the attribute. The column numbers correspond to the models
presented in Table 2.2. Note that marginal implicit prices are not calculated for the
models in column 1 or column 7 of Table 2.2. Column 1 corresponds to the pre-discovery
model, which does not include any structural attributes. The model presented in column 7
of Table 2.2 is the clustered standard error model and the coefficients and sample
averages are identical to column 6.
All of the coefficients on the attributes included in Table 2.3 were significant
beyond the 1% level for all model specifications. Recall that the SCORE variable is a
measure of home quality. The marginal implicit price of SCORE varies littles across
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alternative specifications (between $1,266 and $1,319). Similarly, the marginal implicit
price of BATHROOMS is relatively invariant (between $10,114 and $10,901).
Recall that the variable SQUAREFT is specified as 1,000s of square feet of the
structure. There appears to be a slight difference in how square footage is valued in
homes closest to where labs locate. When the sample is limited to homes within 0.3 miles
of a past, present or future lab, the marginal implicit price is around $42,200 per 1,000
square feet. When the full sample is included, the marginal implicit price is
approximately $50,300 per 1,000 square feet. Similarly, home ageing appears to affect
prices differently between homes closest to the lab and those further away. The marginal
implicit price for the limited sample models is approximately -$820 per year. When the
full sample is included, the marginal implicit price of an additional year of home age is
approximately -$1,250. The marginal implicit price for ACRES is lower for homes in
the limited sample models than in the full sample models (~$24,000 to ~$25,600,
respectively).

2.6.5

Auxiliary Models (Robustness Checks)

Although the significance of coefficients estimated in the primary empirical
specifications provide evidence of the impacts of meth lab discovery and cleanup, the
optimal specification of distance-rings for the assignment of the treatment and control
groups is not directly known. The choice of assigning homes within 0.1 miles of a lab to
the treatment group and homes within 0.3 miles to the control group follows Linden and
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Rockoff (2008); however, to assess the robustness of the estimates to the specification of
distance-rings, auxiliary models are estimated analogous to the model specified in Eq.
2.4, utilizing alternative distance-ring specifications for the treatment and control group.
Table 2.4 presents the results of these auxiliary models. While changing the
distance bands does have a noticeable impact on a number of parameters, the most
important result is that, across all specifications, the impact of lab discovery in the
treatment group is negative, and highly significant (beyond 1% for all specifications).
While the impact of lab cleanup on the treatment group appears to be somewhat sensitive
to the choice distance bands, the coefficient is positive and significant for most of the six
specifications, losing power as the treatment and control bands increase in size.
Table 2.5 presents the results of an additional auxiliary model which accounts for
the passage of time following the discovery of a lab. These models are estimated to
explicitly control for the passage of time following discovery of a lab. As another study
found that the impact of the lab discovery diminishes over time (Congdon-Hohman,
2013), it could be argued that the lab decontamination parameter estimated in the primary
models of this study is simply acting as a proxy for the passage of time. For both models
in Table 2.5, the lab discovery variable is interacted with a binary time-since-discovery
variable that is grouped in 6-month bins. Column 1 of Table 2.5 excludes the
decontamination parameter, and the results suggest that the over time the impact of the
discovery of the lab diminishes in magnitude considerably. However, when the
decontamination parameter is included (column 2 of Table 2.5), the passage of time
appears to have a much smaller role in the recovery of home prices. For example, six to
twelve months following the discovery of the lab, the negative impact on homes in the
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treatment group is approximately -10.06% (significant beyond the 1% level). Even after
36 months, the impact of the discovery remains high in magnitude (-8.79%) and
significance (beyond the 1% level). Furthermore, controlling for the potentially
confounding passage-of-time effect increases the magnitude of the lab decontamination
impact. When the model controls for time-since-discovery decontamination has an
approximate 6.18% positive impact on the price of homes in the treatment group
(significant beyond the 1% level).
The auxiliary models which include recoded distance and timing binary variables
(from overlapping to exclusive) are presented in Table 2.7. In the primary models, the
coefficients on D 0.1 and D0.1 * disc are additive. Here, the relative magnitude of the
impacts is more important, as D 0.1 is the effect on price of a home being within 0.1 miles
of a lab that will eventually be discovered. Column 1 of Table 2.7 depicts the lab
discovery model with exclusive coding and the full dataset, corresponding to Eq. 2.11.
Homes within 0.1 miles of a lab sell at a discount of approximately 3.5% prior to the
discovery of the lab, and 8% following the discovery of the lab. Column 2 of Table 2.7
presents the results from the lab decontamination model with the full dataset,
corresponding to the model presented in Eq. 2.12. The results from this model again
highlight the importance of accounting for lab decontamination. Prior to discovery homes
within 0.1 miles of a lab sell at an approximate 3.2% discount. After discovery the homes
within 0.1 miles of a lab sell at a 10.4% discount (opposed to an estimated 8% discount
when decontamination is not included). After decontamination, homes within 0.1 miles of
a discovered lab sell at a 6.9% discount. Note that the coefficient on the decontamination
parameter is negative. This is because the model does not capture the marginal effect of
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decontamination. In this specification the decontamination parameter captures the
marginal effect of the home being located within 0.1 miles of discovered meth lab that
has been decontamination, relative to the reference level of greater than 0.3 miles from
the lab.
The auxiliary model which measures the impact of lab proximity using a
continuous distance variable is presented in Column 5 of Table 2.7. Recall that this
specification only includes homes within 0.3 miles of a discovered meth lab. As expected
the parameter is positive (statistically significant at beyond the 1% level), indicating that
home values increase as they move away from a discovered meth lab.

2.7

Discussion and Conclusion

This study uses a novel dataset constructed from geo-coded meth lab and property
sale data from Linn County, Oregon to explore the relationship between meth lab
discovery and decontamination on home prices. The endogeneity of meth lab locations
(i.e., meth labs appear to locate in lower-priced neighborhoods) is mitigated using a
spatial difference-in-difference hedonic price model.
Robust evidence is found that the discovery of a meth lab has a significant,
negative impact on properties within close proximity to a lab. In our preferred model it is
estimated that property values decrease by 6.2% after the discovery of a meth lab. Using
a number of alternative distance specifications we find that this effect is robust (estimates
vary from 6.3% to 3.1% and are all significant beyond the 1% level). In terms of lab
decontamination, in the preferred distance-rings specification and in most auxiliary
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specifications, we find evidence demonstrating that meth lab decontamination
considerably (but not fully) offsets the impact of meth house discovery on property
values. This could reflect the difference between environmental and neighborhood
externalities associated with the discovery of a meth lab (e.g., McCluskey & Rausser,
2003). Nonetheless, future research is necessary to better understand the impact of meth
house cleanup on property values.
Overall, these results point to a relatively unexplored negative consequence of
substance abuse. Illegal drug production may cause proximal home owners to suffer
reduced property values. This is bad for a number of reasons namely, that their wealth
has been decreased, but also this is indicative of a reduction in welfare associated with
those living in this area. Additionally, there could be a loss of tax revenue from these
properties.
While this study finds that lab discovery and lab decontamination has a
statistically significant impact on home prices, this evidence should be interpreted
carefully as this study currently has a number of limitations. First, it is possible that meth
labs were observed within the neighborhood (and potential buyers) before formally
documented in the OHA CDLP dataset. To assess the impact of a potential lag between
the time that neighboring property owners observe the lab and the lab being reported to
the OHA CDLP, an auxiliary model is estimated where property sale observations in the
treatment group are excluded if they took place during the 6 months prior to OHA CDLP
notification. The estimated impact of lab discovery actually increases in this
specification, and remains statistically significant beyond the 1% level. Finally, while the
availability of Linn County meth house and property value data made it ideal for this
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study, the findings are not necessarily generalizable and future work should explore other
states and geographies.
Although there are a number of caveats and limitations, this investigation
represents an important step in understanding the impact of meth and other illicit drug
production on home prices. The value of lab decontamination in particular, will be an
important issue in the coming years as more states consider adoption of mandatory
decontamination legislation. We hope that this investigation spurs further research into
this issue.
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Table 2.1. Summary statistics for hedonic function explanatory variables

D 0.1  1

Variable
SCORE

BATHROOMS
BEDROOMS

SQUAREFT
ACRES
ln  AGE 

ACTIVESELLER
ACTIVEBUYER
MANUFACTURED
FEDBUYER
FEDSELLER
SCHOOL

 n  1806 

D 0.3  1

 n  8025 

All Homes
 n  18819 

77.8256
(16.6590)
1.6390
(0.7483)
2.8488
(0.9109)
1.3116
(0.4936)
0.1990
(0.1902)
3.4504
(1.2651)
0.2093
(0.4069)
0.0648
(0.2462)
0.0415
(0.1996)
0.0006
(0.0235)
0.0011
(0.0333)
0.2802
(0.4492)

80.3690
(15.6531)
1.6688
(0.7090)
2.8561
(0.7940)
1.3249
(0.4770)
0.2088
(0.3518)
3.2675
(1.3261)
0.2249
(0.4176)
0.0501
(0.2182)
0.0432
(0.2034)
0.0001
(0.0112)
0.0006
(0.0250)
0.2866
(0.4522)

83.3700
(15.8941)
1.8085
(0.7069)
2.9482
(0.7256)
1.4076
(0.4892)
0.2314
(0.3536)
2.8784
(1.4468)
0.2558
(0.4363)
0.0427
(0.2022)
0.0449
(0.2070)
0.0001
(0.0073)
0.0006
(0.0242)
0.2070
(0.4052)

Table 2.2. Empirical results (binary distance and temporal variables)

D

0.1

PreDiscovery
(1)
-0.069***
(0.026)

D0.1 * Discovery
D0.1 * Clean
D 0.3

-0.164***
(0.014)

D0.3 * Discovery
D0.3 * Clean

Constant
Observations
R-squared
Year Fixed Effects
Census-Block Fixed Effects
Housing Characteristics
Restricted to 0.3 Miles
Lab Area Clustered SE
Excluding Post-Discovery
Sales

11.942***
(0.013)
12,053
0.092


Full Sample
(2)
-0.026***
(0.007)

(3)
-0.003
(0.014)
-0.029**
(0.015)

(4)
-0.004
(0.014)
-0.067***
(0.019)
0.049***
(0.016)
-0.046*** -0.029*** -0.028***
(0.005)
(0.009)
(0.009)
-0.021**
-0.016*
(0.009)
(0.010)
-0.007
(0.007)
10.610*** 10.602*** 10.604***
(0.025)
(0.026)
(0.026)
18,818
18,818
18,818
0.628
0.629
0.629










Limited (sales within 0.3 miles)
(5)
0.007
(0.015)
-0.027*
(0.016)

(6)
0.005
(0.015)
-0.059***
(0.021)
0.043**
(0.018)

(7)
0.005
(0.017)
-0.059**
(0.026)
0.043**
(0.019)

-0.000
(0.011)

0.003
0.003
(0.012)
(0.014)
-0.002
-0.002
(0.009)
(0.013)
10.373*** 10.378*** 10.387***
(0.056)
(0.056)
(0.091)
8,025
8,025
8,025
0.577
0.578
0.694
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Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.3. Marginal implicit price for home attributes
Full Sample
Limited (sales within 0.3 miles)
(2)

D0.1 * Discovery

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-$4,425

-$9,030

-$3,549

-$6,873

D0.1 * Clean

$6,540
$1,319

$4,674

SCORE

$1,319

$1,317

$1,269

$1,266

BATHROOMS

$10,114 $10,133 $10,116

$10,901

$10,871

SQUAREFT

$50,349 $50,284 $50,303

$42,208

$42,231

ACRES

$25,653 $25,673 $25,695

$24,003

$24,022

ln  AGE 

-$1,246

-$822

-$826

-$1,250

-$1,254

Table 2.4. Auxiliary models: alternative treatment and control specifications

Treatment Distance:
Control Distance:
D Treatment
DTreatment * Discovery

DTreatment * Clean
D Control

DControl * Discovery

DControl * Clean

Constant
Observations
R-squared
Number of Census Block

(1)
0.1 Miles
0.2 Miles
-0.005
(0.015)
-0.052**
(0.022)
0.043**
(0.018)
-0.019*
(0.010)
-0.027**
(0.013)
0.002
(0.011)
10.603***
(0.026)
18,818
0.628
449

(3)
(4)
(2)
0.1 Miles
0.1 Miles
0.1 Miles
0.4 Miles
0.5 Miles
0.3 Miles
0.002
-0.002
-0.004
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.014)
-0.067*** -0.068*** -0.063***
(0.019)
(0.018)
(0.019)
0.037**
0.031**
0.049***
(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.016)
-0.028*** -0.049*** -0.039***
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.009)
-0.012
-0.024***
-0.016*
(0.009)
(0.008)
(0.010)
0.012**
0.025***
-0.007
(0.006)
(0.006)
(0.007)
10.614***
10.618***
10.604***
(0.026)
(0.026)
(0.026)
18,818
18,818
18,818
0.629
0.629
0.629
449
449
449
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(5)
0.2 Miles
0.3 Miles
-0.006
(0.011)
-0.042***
(0.014)
0.024**
(0.012)
-0.026**
(0.010)
-0.005
(0.011)
-0.012
(0.009)
10.597***
(0.026)
18,818
0.629
449

(6)
0.2 Miles
0.4 Miles
0.003
(0.010)
-0.040***
(0.012)
0.005
(0.010)
-0.049***
(0.009)
-0.004
(0.009)
0.014**
(0.007)
10.606***
(0.026)
18,818
0.629
449

(7)
0.2 Miles
0.5 Miles
-0.005
(0.009)
-0.033***
(0.011)
-0.002
(0.010)
-0.036***
(0.009)
-0.018**
(0.009)
0.027***
(0.006)
10.608***
(0.026)
18,818
0.629
449
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Table 2.5. Primary DD models with time since discovery

D 0.1
Discovery
D0.1 * 0-6
Months
Discovery
D0.1 * 6-12
Months
Discovery
D0.1 *12-18
Months

Discovery
D0.1 *18-24
Months

Discovery
D0.1 * 24-30
Months
Discovery
D0.1 * 30-36
Months
Discovery
D0.1 * 36+
Months

(1)
(Without Decontamination)
0.0017
(0.0139)
-0.0050
(0.0336)
-0.0671**
(0.0310)
0.0009
(0.0301)
-0.0074
(0.0285)
-0.0311
(0.0281)
0.0132
(0.0302)
-0.0399**
(0.0159)

D0.1 * Clean

D 0.3
Discovery
D0.3 * 0-6
Months
Discovery
D0.3 * 6-12
Months
Discovery
D0.3 *12-18
Months
Discovery
D0.3 *18-24
Months
Discovery
D0.3 * 24-30
Months

Discovery
D0.3 * 30-36
Months
Discovery
D0.3 * 36+
Months

-0.0282***
(0.0087)
-0.0248*
(0.0141)
-0.0055
(0.0140)
-0.0281**
(0.0140)
-0.0276*
(0.0144)
-0.0221
(0.0145)
-0.0161
(0.0145)
-0.0226**
(0.0093)

D0.3 * Clean

Constant
Observations
R-squared
Year FE
Census Block FE
Housing Characteristics
Restricted to Lab Areas

10.5983***
(0.0256)
18,818
0.6297




Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(2)
(With Decontamination)
-0.0030
(0.0139)
-0.0142
(0.0337)
-0.0985***
(0.0325)
-0.0377
(0.0324)
-0.0476
(0.0311)
-0.0672**
(0.0303)
-0.0343
(0.0335)
-0.0892***
(0.0219)
0.0575***
(0.0177)
-0.0280***
(0.0088)
-0.0230
(0.0141)
-0.0023
(0.0144)
-0.0244*
(0.0146)
-0.0226
(0.0150)
-0.0184
(0.0152)
-0.0116
(0.0153)
-0.0183*
(0.0109)
-0.0056
(0.0078)
10.6007***
(0.0256)
18,818
0.630
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Table 2.6. Primary model with clustered standard errors
(1)
(2)
VARIABLES
Lab Area Clustered SE
Census Block Clustered SE
0.005
-0.004
D 0.1
(0.017)
(0.018)
-0.059**
-0.067***
D0.1 * Discovery
(0.026)
(0.025)
0.1
Clean
0.043**
0.049**
D *
(0.019)
(0.021)
0.3
-0.028**
D
(0.012)
0.3
Discovery
0.003
-0.016
D *
(0.014)
(0.012)
-0.002
-0.007
D0.3 * Clean
(0.013)
(0.010)
Constant
10.387***
10.620***
(0.091)
(0.051)
Observations
8,025
18,818
R-squared
0.694
0.719


Year FE


Census Block FE

Lab Area Clustered SE

Census Block Clustered SE


Housing Characteristics


Restricted to Lab Areas
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7. Auxiliary Models
(1)

DISTANCE
D 0.1

D0.1 * disc
D0.1 * clean
D 0.3

D0.3 * disc
D0.3 * clean
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Year FE
Census Block FE
Housing Characteristics
Restricted to Sales w/i 0.3
Miles

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)
0.219***
(0.051)

-0.036*** -0.033**
0.002
0.002
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.016)
(0.016)
-0.083*** -0.110*** -0.025* -0.051***
(0.008)
(0.014)
(0.014)
(0.019)
-0.072***
-0.018
(0.009)
(0.015)
-0.024*** -0.020**
(0.009)
(0.009)
-0.050*** -0.040***
-0.005
-0.003
(0.005)
(0.008)
(0.012)
(0.013)
-0.052***
-0.007
(0.005)
(0.013)
10.590*** 10.591*** 10.378*** 10.382*** 10.297***
(0.026)
(0.026)
(0.056)
(0.056)
(0.063)
18,818
18,818
8,025
8,025
6,766
0.629
0.629
0.579
0.580
0.583



















Figure 2-1. Visual depiction of identification strategy
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Figure 2-2. Methamphetamine labs in Linn County, Oregon (1996-2013)
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Figure 2-3. Property sales in Linn County, Oregon (1999-2013)
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Figure 2-4. Price trends before and after lab discovery
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Chapter 3: The Impact of Behavioral Risk Reduction Interventions on Willingness
to Pay to Avoid Sexually Transmitted Infections: A Stated Preference Study of
Justice-Involved Youth

3.1

Introduction

Every year in the US over one-third of all deaths can be attributed to modifiable
behaviors such as smoking, alcohol abuse, poor diet and risky sexual behavior
(Schroeder, 2007). The treatment of chronic morbidity linked to these behaviors accounts
for over 75% of all health care costs (Fisher et al., 2011). To mitigate the burden
associated with preventable disease numerous behavioral public health interventions have
been implemented in the US, addressing a diverse range of health risks (e.g., childhood
obesity (Durant, Baskin, Thomas, & Allison, 2008; Stice, Shaw, & Marti, 2006); problem
drinking (Cuijpers, Riper, & Lemmers, 2004; Dinh-Zarr, Diguiseppi, Heitman, &
Roberts, 1999); and tobacco use (Biglan, Ary, Smolkowski, Duncan, & Black, 2000;
Bruvold, 1993; Siegel, 2002)). Risky sexual behavior, in particular, poses an increasingly
burdensome cost upon the healthcare system. One-third of all Americans will contract a
Sexually Transmitted Infection (STI) at some point in their lives (Summers, Kates, &
Murphy, 2002) and the lifetime treatment costs resulting from a single year of STIs in the
US exceeds $15.6 billion. Moreover, adolescents and young adults, the least-experienced
and most-vulnerable portion of the sexually-active US population, contract a
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disproportionately large number of new STIs (H. W. Chesson, J. M. Blandford, T. L.
Gift, G. Tao, & K. L. Irwin, 2004).
In attempting to modify sexual risk behavior, it is well known that interventions
that are based on validated theories of health behavior are more successful than those that
are not (Glanz & Bishop, 2010). Reviews and meta-analyses indicate that the Theory of
Planned Behavior (TPB), a widely-used theoretical perspective, is particularly successful
(Armitage & Conner, 2001; Sutton, 2004). The TPB defines the relationship between
beliefs and behavior and posits that behaviors result most proximally from intentions,
which are in turn determined by attitudes, social norms, and self-efficacy/perceived
control (Ajzen, 1991). In addition to demonstrating clinical efficacy, theory-based
behavioral interventions have been shown to be cost-effective when evaluated from an
economic perspective (Dealy, Horn, Callahan, & Bryan, 2013; Wang et al., 2000).
Moreover, research at the intersection of economics and psychology is proving to be
mutually beneficial. For example, economic incentives such as cash payments and
lotteries are increasingly being incorporated into health behavior interventions (Dallery,
Silverman, Chutuape, Bigelow, & Stitzer, 2001; Dunn, Saulsgiver, & Sigmon, 2011;
Gray et al., 2011; Operario, Kuo, Sosa-Rubí, & Gálarraga, 2013). Additionally, while
economic models do not generally consider the role of attitudes and intentions
independently, empirical health economics studies have found that individuals respond to
incentives when making choices about health risk behavior, including choices about risky
sex (Klick & Stratmann, 2003, 2007; Levine, 2001), smoking (Gruber & Zinman, 2001)
and marijuana use (Pacula et al., 2000). However, when modeling risky health behavior,
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economic models typically regard preferences as stable and heterogeneity in behavior is
typically explained using discount rates (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'donoghue, 2002).8
One method that can be used to better understand the behavioral impact of a risky
health behavior intervention is a survey method known as Contingent Valuation (CV).
This method is a long-standing economic preference elicitation technique, which is
increasingly being utilized outside of standard economic contexts to elicit economic
preferences when direct markets do not exist. A number of studies have utilized the CV
method in the context of STI. For instance, Galárraga, Sosa-Rubí, Infante, Gertler, and
Bertozzi (2014) use the CV method to estimate individuals’ Willingness To Accept
(WTA) compensation for participating in HIV/AIDS interventions and Gupta and Trivedi
(2014) estimate the Willingness To Pay (WTP) for health insurance for people living
with HIV in India. Additionally, Poulos et al. (2011) estimate mothers’ WTP to vaccinate
their children against human papillomavirus. Furthermore, the CV method has been used
to evaluate how different levels of information impact WTP for health programs
(Protière, Donaldson, Luchini, Moatti, & Shackley, 2004).
In this study, we build upon the existing literature by using the CV method to test
if behavioral interventions (or more generally attitudes, intentions and information)
impact the perceived costs of risky behavior. Specifically, data were obtained through
Project MARS (Motivating Adolescents to Reduce Sexual Risk; (Callahan, Montanaro,
Magnan, & Bryan, 2013)), which is a randomized, sexual risk-reduction intervention for
justice-involved youth designed to change TPB constructs of attitudes towards condom

8

Significant attention has been given to the appropriate type of discount rate (i.e.,
exponential, hyperbolic, quasi-hyperbolic, etc.), and whether the discount rate (in any
form) can explain differences in risky health behaviors.
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use, norms supportive of condom use, self-efficacy for condom use, and intentions to use
condoms. As part of this trial, participants were asked questions eliciting their WTP to
avoid three different categories of STI (curable, incurable and fatal) prior to the
intervention and three months after the intervention. This unique pre-post CV survey
design is used to test if the MARS intervention changed participants’ WTP to avoid STI.
Additionally, because WTP was elicited for multiple levels of infection severity, both
before and after the intervention was received, this study contributes to an ongoing debate
in the health economic literature on what is referred to as ‘scope sensitivity’ (or if
individual’s elicited WTP is sensitive to the level or nature of the good valued).
Overall, results indicate that the MARS intervention did in fact increased
participants’ WTP to avoid both incurable and fatal STI. Thus, evidence is found that
perceived costs may not be stable, and can be changed by behavioral interventions.
Additionally, after receiving the intervention, this unique cohort of justice involved youth
were found to be sensitive to scope, providing evidence of construct validity.

3.2

Background on Contingent Valuation

A number of stated preference survey methods are used to estimate the monetary
value of goods and services that are not generally traded in markets (Bishop, Champ, &
Mullarkey, 1995). Within this broader set, CV is the most commonly used preference
elicitation approach (Boyle, 2003; Carson, 2012). CV surveys elicit individuals’ WTP or
WTA compensation responses using various survey modes and elicitation formats. The
most direct elicitation format, open-ended, simply asks individuals to provide their
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maximum WTP. Alternatives include a variety of close-ended or discrete choice formats
to indirectly measure WTP or WTA, such as voting responses to a proposed public goods
referendum where the tax payment is varied across the sample (Boyle, 2003; Carson,
2012).
As applications continue to expand, the CV method has been used extensively in a
variety of contexts, including a growing literature in health care and services. The
increased utilization in health care can be explained by the similarity of health care to
goods to environmental goods: both will often require policy interventions when the
market fails to allocate efficiently (Hanley, Ryan, & Wright, 2003). CV studies in the
context of health care include; valuation of alternative treatments for health conditions
(Doyle et al., 2012), parents valuation of healthcare for their children (Poulos et al., 2011;
Vermaire, Van Exel, Van Loveren, & Brouwer, 2012) alternative healthcare delivery
programs (Callan & O'Shea, 2015; Shono, Kondo, Ohmae, & Okubo, 2014).
Although well-constructed CV studies often exhibit considerable reliability (e.g.,
temporal stability), or meet various validity indicators (e.g., expected responses to
payment amounts or income effects), there are persistent concerns about potential
hypothetical bias (where stated value differs from true value) (Haab, Interis, Petrolia, &
Whitehead, 2013). Further, there remains debate about whether elicited WTP responses
are sensitive to positive or negative changes in the elicited good (e.g. size, or geographic
scale or levels of impacts or severity). Tests for the sensitivity of WTP responses to
changes in goods are commonly referred to as scope tests (Carson, 2012; Hausman, 2012;
Kling, Phaneuf, & Zhao, 2012). For example, if a respondent is presented with two
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different quantities of an identical good, then WTP for the larger quantity should exceed
WTP for the smaller quantity.
It is now common for studies to include explicit tests of scope sensitivity (Carson
& Mitchell, 1995). Passing a scope test provides evidence of a CV survey’s construct
validity, which involves ‘theoretical and intuitive prior expectations about the
relationship that should exist between variables’ (Bishop, 2003). This requires that the
values elicited from the survey are capturing the preferences of the good intended. If
elicited preferences do not conform to standard economic theory, then questions arise as
to the validity of the survey instrument. The most commonly applied scope test is a
within-subject comparison of WTP for alternative quantities of the hypothetical good. For
instance, willingness-to-pay for a health risk reduction should be positively associated
with the magnitude of the risk reduction and severity of the health risk (Hammitt &
Graham, 1999).
Scope tests require that individuals assign a value to alternative levels of the good,
so it is important for the survey instrument to describe clearly differentiated levels of
precisely the same good. Take for example the value of benefits conferred by a
government program. The valuation of these benefits consist not only of the value of the
program delivered with certainty, but also the probability an individual assigns to the
likelihood of the government being able to deliver on their promises. As Carson (2012)
points out, “… for a substantial fraction of the public, the likelihood of the government
delivering on very large projects can be perceived to be much lower than that for smaller
projects,”. If tests of scopes in a CV study include increasing the quantity or quality of a
good beyond realistic levels, then respondents may not value the unrealistically large
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change more than a modest, but realistic change. In a CV study of alternative government
health-programs, Olsen, Donaldson, and Pereira (2004b) test the sensitivity of WTP for
heart attack risk reductions to alternative levels of reduction (10%, 20%, and 40%). The
authors find that WTP decreases with the size of the risk reduction, with the largest WTP
elicited for the 10% reduction. The authors conclude that respondents’ are insensitive to
scope in the context of evaluating heart attack risk reduction. However, an important
observation from this study is that the number of zero bids increases dramatically with
the size of the promised reduction, which may have changed the character of the good in
unintended ways. For example, the spike in zero bids could reflect disbelief in the
government’s ability to deliver such high reductions in risk.
In a meta-analysis of CV studies and scope effects, Carson (1997) finds that a
majority of the studies that included scope tests (at that time, 31 out of 35) were able to
reject the scope insensitivity hypothesis. Additionally, a number of CV studies across a
variety of health and healthcare contexts have found scope sensitivity (Bobinac, van Exel,
Rutten, & Brouwer, 2014; Greenberg, Bakhai, Neumann, & Cohen, 2004; van den Berg,
Brouwer, Exel, & Koopmanschap, 2005). However, some counterexamples exist (Olsen,
Donaldson, & Pereira, 2004a; Olsen, Røgeberg, & Stavem, 2012; Søgaard, Lindholt, &
Gyrd-Hansen, 2012). Whitty (2012) advocates for additional investigation into the
underlying reason for when we do not find scope sensitivity.

3.3

Data
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3.3.1

Data Collection

Data used in this study were collected from questionnaires administered during
the clinical trial phase of Project MARS (Callahan et al., 2013), between July 2010 and
March 2012. Project MARS was an intervention designed to reduce sexual risk behavior
among justice-involved youth. The intervention was delivered to justice-involved
adolescents (ages 14-18) in a short-term juvenile detention center in the South-western
US. Research assistants visited the detention center on a weekly basis and provided all
new arrivals the opportunity to participate. The program was described as a research
study conducted by the University of New Mexico. Adolescents who expressed interest
in the study met individually and privately with a research assistant to complete
informed-consent documents. Upon receipt of adolescent consent, parent/guardian
consent was obtained and recorded via telephone for each adolescent, consistent with
previous studies (Schmiege, Broaddus, Levin, & Bryan, 2009). This intervention was
based on previously successful HIV/STD risk reduction interventions conducted with
young adults (Bryan, Schmiege, & Broaddus, 2009) and was comprised of a single threehour session, with up to six justice-involved adolescents participating in each intervention
group.
After completing the baseline assessment, participants were randomly assigned to
receive one of the three group-based interventions. Participants received $30 for
completing the baseline questionnaire and participating in the intervention. Those who
completed the three-month follow-up questionnaire received an additional $40 upon
completion. This project was approved by the University of New Mexico’s Human
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Research Review Committee and, because participants were in a detention facility, the
national Office of Human Research Protections. A certificate of confidentiality was
obtained from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to further protect participant
privacy.

3.3.2

CV Survey Design

MARS participants answered a series of CV survey questions eliciting their
maximum WTP to avoid three different categories of STIs (curable, incurable, and fatal).
All questionnaires were administered using the ACASI (Audio Computer Assisted SelfInterview) survey method. The same survey instrument was administered to participants
both prior to the intervention and at three months after the intervention. WTP questions
were open-ended, but bounded between $0 and $100 000. The exact wording appeared in
the survey instrument as:

How much is the maximum you would pay to not get a curable STD
(curable STDs are things like Chlamydia and Gonorrhea)?
I would pay $__________.
How much is the maximum you would pay to not get an incurable,
non-fatal STD (incurable, non-fatal STDs are things like Herpes and
HPV)?
I would pay $__________.
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How much is the maximum you would pay to not get a fatal STD (A
fatal STD is HIV/AIDS)?
I would pay $__________.

All respondents answered the three valuation questions in the same order: curable,
incurable and fatal. Each question was presented separately and respondents saw only
one question on the computer screen at a time. The three goods are all defined in terms of
avoiding an STI, but with distinct categories of impact severity. Utilizing terminology
from Carson and Mitchell (1995), each respondent is presented a bottom-up valuation
sequence of avoiding infection with increasing negative health impact or severity in the
scope of the STI. This allows for a within-sample or internal test of scope (Carson &
Mitchell, 1995).

3.4

Empirical Approach

3.4.1

Theoretical Considerations

The WTP to avoid an STI can be defined using the following indirect utility
function:
V  P, STI 0j , M  WTPj   V  P, STI 1j , M   u1

(3.1)

where V    is the indirect utility function, P is a vector of prices for marketed goods
0
(i.e., all other goods that individuals purchase with their income), STI j represents the
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current level of respondent infectivity, where the superscript indicates whether the
respondent is infected ( 0  uninfected), and the subscript j  c, inc, f  represents the
severity level, curable, incurable and fatal infections, respectively. Additionally, in this
model, M indicates income, u1 is the reference level of utility (corresponding to utility if
infected with an STI), and WTPj is the income adjustment that would make an individual
indifferent between the two states (infected with original income and uninfected with
income adjustment). Further, WTPj is interpreted exactly as it was presented to
respondents: the maximum WTP to avoid STI j . Thus, in this context, WTPj is a Hicksian
equivalent welfare change measure (A. M. Freeman, 2003).
Alternatively, the Hicksian equivalent welfare change measure, WTPj , can be
presented explicitly as the difference between two expenditure functions:
WTPj  e  P, STI 0j , u1   e  P, STI 1j , u1 

It is assumed that variation in respondents’ WTPj is determined by the category

(3.2)

 j

of

STI for which it is elicited, as well as subjects’ socioeconomic characteristics and
subjective risk perceptions. The WTP function can thus be represented as
WTPi , j ,t  g  X i , STI j ,t 

(3.3)

where Xi is a vector of socioeconomic characteristics including personal experiences,
and STI j ,t is a vector of binary variables corresponding to infection category (i.e.,

j  c, inc, f  ) and time period (i.e., t  0,1 , where 0 indicates pre-intervention and 1
indicates post-intervention).
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3.4.2

Econometric Model

An econometric model is specified to estimate the impact of the MARS
intervention on participants’ (log-transformed) WTP to avoid STIs. To test the impact of
the intervention on participants’ WTP to avoid infections, and to test sensitivity to scope
(infection severity), log-transformed WTP estimates are transformed back into dollars,
generating median WTP estimates, with standard errors calculated using the Delta
method.
WTP was elicited using an open-ended format and the survey restricted
participants’ response to the range of values between $0 and $100 000. To account for the
censored nature of the dependent variable, a double-bounded Tobit model (Awad &
Holländer, 2010; Martínez-Paz & Perni, 2011) is used with the following specification
ln WTPi*, j ,t   X i'   STI 'j ,t   i ,t

(3.4)

where ln WTPi *,j ,t  is respondent i 's  i  1,..., N  log-transformed latent maximum WTP
to avoid STI j elicited either prior to the intervention ( t  0 ), or three months after
receiving the intervention ( t  1). A random-effect error term (  i ,t ) is included in order to
account for the fact that each respondent enters the dataset more than once and includes
an individual-specific error component, as well as an idiosyncratic error term. Timeinvariant socioeconomic characteristics are represented by the Xi vector. Included within
the Xi vector are binary variables for GENDER (=1if male) and WHITE (=1 if
respondent identified as white), which are included in order to account for heterogeneity
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in both race and gender. Note that participant ethnicity is accounted for with only a single
binary variable. Furthermore, binary variables for STITEST (=1 if respondent tested
positive for Chlamydia or Gonorrhea prior to the intervention), PREGNANCY (=1 if
respondent has been involved in a pregnancy), and ABORTION (=1 if respondent was
involved in a pregnancy which was aborted) are included to account for heterogeneity
associated with negative sexual consequences.

3.4.3

Intervention Effects and Scope Tests

Predicted median WTP estimates are first used to the test the effect of the
intervention on participants’ WTP. Recall that participants answered the CV questions
both before and after the intervention, which allows us to test the impact of the
intervention using the following null and alternative hypotheses:
H10 : WTPj ,0  WTPj ,1
H1A : WTPj ,0  WTPj ,1

(3.5)

Note that this test represents three separate two-tailed t-tests (one for each STI category,

j  c, inc, f  ) that test if participants’ WTP to avoid an STI increases after receiving the
intervention ( t  1 versus t  0 ).
In addition, WTP estimates are also used to test participant’s sensitivity to the
severity of infection (or sensitivity to scope). In the context of STI acquisition, as the
severity of negative health impacts increase, the perceived cost, or WTP to avoid these
impacts should also increase. To test if respondents’ WTP did in fact increase with
severity level, the following null and alternative hypotheses are used:
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H 202 : WTPinc ,t  WTPf ,t
H 201 : WTPc,t  WTPinc,t
and
H 2 A2 : WTPinc,t  WTPf ,t
H 2 A1 : WTPc,t  WTPinc ,t

(3.6)

Each scope test (one at baseline data and the other one after the intervention) is a
combination of two, one-tailed t-tests, which test whether participants are willing to pay
more to avoid more severe STIs. If WTP is insensitive to STI category, WTP would not
increase from curable to incurable and from incurable to fatal.

3.4.4 Robustness Tests

In order to test the robustness of the empirical models, a number of auxiliary
models are estimated. First, single-period models are estimated to detect the difference in
WTP for different levels of STI severity in each period (pre- and post-intervention)
separately. Again, log-transformed willingness to pay is estimated with a double-bounded
Tobit model:
ln WTPi*, j   X i'   STI 'j   i

(3.7)

The next specification is interested in the detecting the impact of the intervention
treatment for each STI separately. Similar to the primary model, this model estimates a
random effects double-bounded Tobit model:
ln WTPi*,t   X i'   STIt'   i ,t

3.5

Results

(3.8)
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3.5.1

Summary Statistics: Project MARS Participants

264 justice-involved youth participated in the intervention and baseline interview,
and 206 participants completed the three-month post-intervention questionnaire. Two of
the 206 participants who completed the three-month follow-up did not complete the WTP
questions, and are excluded from the analysis. Thus, 204 total participants are included in
the analysis.
Summary statistics are presented in Table 3.1. The majority of the MARS
participants utilized in this analysis identified as either Hispanic (71.1%) or White
(24.5%). Other ethnicities represented in the sample include Native American (7.8%),
Black (6.9%) and Asian or Pacific Islander (<1%). This distribution is roughly consistent
with the population of juvenile offenders in the South-western US (Puzzanchera, Sladky,
& Kang, 2011). Additionally, approximately 23% of participants were female. Recent
statistics on justice-involved youth in this region suggest that females comprise
approximately 14% of the population (Sickmund, Sladky, Kang, & Puzzanchera, 2011).
Thus, young women might be slightly overrepresented in the sample. On average,
participants were just over 16 years old and just under a 9th grade education.
Prior to the intervention, approximately 8% of the subjects tested positive for
either Gonorrhea  n  6  or Chlamydia  n  12  , and one subject tested positive for both.
All participants who tested positive for Chlamydia or Gonorrhea were treated for their
infections by project staff under the direction of an adolescent medicine specialist. Over
one-third of the participants (38%) reported that they had been involved in a pregnancy,
and 9% reported having been involved in a pregnancy that was ultimately aborted. Both
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male and female participants were asked questions regarding pregnancies. However, note
that this number could include underreporting as it is possible that male participants did
not have knowledge of their involvement in a pregnancy.

3.5.2

Tobit Model Estimation

Table 3.2 presents the results from the double-bounded Tobit model. First, note
that the baseline STI and intervention-condition represents the WTP for a curable
infection prior to the intervention (i.e., j  c and t  0 ). The variable INCURABLE
indicates a change in severity of the infection in the pre-intervention period from curable
to incurable (i.e., a change from j  c to j  inc ) and FATAL indicates a change in the
severity of infection in the pre-intervention period from curable to fatal (i.e., a change
from j  c to j  f ). Changes in the elicited WTP to avoid an infection by severity of
infection after the intervention was received are represented using *INTERVENTION .
Thus, the CURABLE * INTERVENTION parameter represents the difference in the WTP
to avoid a curable STI between the pre-intervention and three-month post-intervention.
Finally, INCURABLE * INTERVENTION and FATAL* INTERVENTION variables
represent both a change in infection severity and intervention condition from the baseline
STI and intervention-condition.
Overall, all of the estimated severity-intervention interaction parameters are
significant at or beyond the 0.01 level except the estimated INCURABLE parameter.
This suggests that both the severity of infection and receiving the intervention are
determinants of WTP to avoid infections (significance between different intervention
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groups is evaluated in the next section). The lack of statistical significance of the
estimated INCURABLE parameter indicates that participants were not willing to pay
more to avoid an incurable infection than a curable infection before the intervention. In
terms of the other explanatory variables, first, the estimated coefficient for WHITE is
positive and significant at the 0.05 level. The estimated coefficient for GENDER is not
significant. This is potentially surprising, given that the costs (as well as single-act
transmission probabilities) for nearly all STIs are greater for females than males.
However, it is plausible that participants do not have full knowledge about treatment
costs or do not plan on paying for treatment themselves. Although the estimated
coefficient for PREGNANCY is not significant, the estimated coefficient for

ABORTION is positive and significant at the 0.05 level, indicating that participants that
have experienced an abortion had a higher WTP to avoid an infection. The estimated
coefficient for STITEST is not significant, indicating that prior experience with curable
infections did not significantly alter WTP to avoid infections. Finally, to evaluate the
robustness of these findings, a number of additional model specifications were estimated,
including separate random-effects Tobit models for each STI category, as well as
separate cross-sectional Tobit models for each STI category. Overall, while there were
some small changes in the significance of the explanatory variables, the impact of both
infection severity and the intervention are robust across alternative model specifications.

3.5.3

Intervention Effects and Scope Tests
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Table 3.3 presents the predicted median WTP to avoid obtaining an STI and the
difference in WTP for STI severity groups and time periods. In this table the first column
presents median WTP estimates. The columns to the right of the first two columns
present a matrix of estimated WTP differences and significance levels, which are used to
test Eq. 3.5 and Eq. 3.6.
In terms of the main results of our study, the median predicted WTP before the
intervention was received is $331.33, $523.26 and $1 720.72 for curable, incurable and
fatal STI respectively and following the intervention, these median predicted WTP
estimates had increased to $855.40, $2 691.73 and $6 643.15. Thus, following the
intervention, MARS participants’ WTP to avoid an infection increased by $524.07 for
curable (~158% increase), $2 168.47 for incurable (~414% increase), and $4 922.43 for
fatal infections (~286% increase). In terms of significance of these results, although the
change in WTP for a curable STI more than doubles following the intervention, this
difference is not statistically significant. Alternatively, following the intervention, the
change in WTP for incurable and fatal STIs are both significant at the 0.05 level. Thus,
for these types of infections, participants were willing to pay significantly more after
receiving the intervention, which supports the alternative hypotheses entailed in Eq. 3.5.
Next, the sensitivity to infection severity (i.e., scope sensitivity) is evaluated both
before and after the intervention was received. Recall that this test (Eq. 6) jointly tests the
change in WTP from curable to incurable and the change in WTP from incurable to fatal.
First, evaluating this test prior to the intervention, respondents’ WTP to avoid incurable
STI exceeds that of curable STI by $191.93 and their WTP to avoid fatal STI exceeds the
WTP to avoid incurable STI by $1 197.46. In terms of statistical significance, while the
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difference between incurable and fatal STI is significant at the 0.05 level, the difference
in median predicted WTP between curable and incurable STI is not significant. Thus,
while WTP to avoid is always increasing with the severity of impacts, prior to the
intervention participants’ WTP to avoid these types of infections were not significantly
different. Next, applying this test to predicted WTP estimates following the intervention,
participants’ WTP to avoid incurable STI exceeds that of curable STI by $1 836.33 and
the WTP to avoid fatal STI exceeds the WTP to avoid incurable STI by $3 951.42, which
are significant at the 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. Thus, not only are the WTP
estimates considerably larger after the intervention, they also pass the scope test at the
0.05 level, which supports the alternative hypothesis in Eq. 6.

3.5.4 Robustness Checks

First, the primary model is adapted to explore how STI severity varies within each period.
Results from this model are reported in Table 3.4. For both models, the baseline STI is curable.
The coefficients on INCURABLE and FATAL represent the change from WTP for a curable
and WTP for an incurable or fatal STI, respectively. In the pre-intervention model,

INCURABLE is not significant, but FATAL is positive and highly significant. This result
supports the findings from the primary model and the median WTP estimates. Prior to the
intervention, MARS participants did not value avoidance of these two STIs differently. The postintervention model also support the findings from the primary model. Following the intervention,
WTP for avoidance of both INCURABLE and FATAL STIs are significantly higher than

CURABLE .
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Auxiliary models estimating the impact of treatment for each STI separately are
presented in Table 3.5. The primary specification shows that the WTP for each STI increases
following the intervention (all significant beyond the 1% level). The results from this auxiliary
specification support the findings of the primary model. For each STI category, WTP increases
significantly in response to the intervention.

3.6

Discussion

In this study, the CV stated preference survey method is used to evaluate the
impact of a behavioral risk reduction intervention for justice-involved youth on the
perceived value of STI avoidance. The results suggest that not only did the intervention
increase MARS participants’ WTP to avoid both incurable and fatal STI but also, after
receiving the intervention, participants’ WTP were more sensitive to infection severity
(sensitive to scope). Thus, evidence is found that behavioral interventions may change the
perceived cost that individuals associate with the outcomes of risky behavior. These
results add to a growing literature about how information (in this case, in terms of
attitudes, social norms, self-efficacy and perceived control) can affect perceived costs,
and hence may be an important component of economic models of risky health behavior
choices.
This paper also contributes to an ongoing debate in the health economics literature
regarding the appropriate contexts for application of the CV method (Gyrd‐Hansen, Kjær,
& Nielsen, 2012; Haab et al., 2013). Prior to the intervention, elicited WTP increased
with infection severity, but was not statistically different between curable and incurable
infections. Following the intervention, WTP was more sensitive to scope of infection
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severity. In other words, the elicited preferences from this unique sample (justiceinvolved youth), evaluating a complex good (STI prevention, with varying scope in
severity of negative health impacts) exhibited statistically significant scope effects. These
results suggest that an impact of the MARS intervention is causing the participants to
value STI avoidance in a more rational fashion. Although the population of this study
may limit the generalizability of the point-estimates on WTP, the lack of numeracy and
formal education should serve to increase confidence in the estimates from the scope tests
and the impact of the intervention on WTP. The intervention did not discuss explicitly
discuss probabilities or relative expenses of the diseases.
One should exercise caution when interpreting these results as this study was
limited by a number of factors. First, the complexity of the survey questions limits the
direct inference that can be derived from our point estimates. Future work could reduce
the required cognitive processing, perhaps by using a dichotomous choice survey method.
For instance, Galárraga et al. (2014) and Olsen et al. (2012) use a double-bounded model
to more accurately simulate market conditions and potentially reduce cognitive
complexity. Additionally, when using an open-ended format it is not clear that the $0 to
$100 000 bounding is needed (especially considering that participants may be willing to
pay more than the upper bound to avoid fatal STI). Second, preference would be more
accurately elicited if the STI avoidance mechanism was better defined (such as a shot or
pill) and a more well-described payment vehicle was provided (such as out-of-pocket
expense). Third, WTP could be better explained by capturing additional socioeconomic
information about participants. For instance, participants with higher income could be
willing to pay more for STI avoidance. Future work would benefit by including longer
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panels and additional covariates. Fourth, the validity of our scope tests would be
improved by randomizing the ordering of the infection severity questions. Finally, this
study evaluated a unique and specific subpopulation: justice-involved youth in the Southwestern US. Results of this study may not be generalizable to lower risk young people or
to other regions of the US. Future work should study the impact of behavioral risk
reduction interventions on the perceived cost of acquiring an STI in other populations.
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Table 3.1. Summary statistics
Variable

Mean

SD

Age

16.07

0.973

Gender (=1 if male)

77%

0.421

Pregnancy

38.2%

0.487

Abortion

6.9%

0.253

Positive STD Test

7.8%

0.270

African American

6.9%

0.253

American Indian/Native American

7.8%

0.270

Asian or Pacific Islander

0.5%

0.070

Hispanic-American

71.1%

0.454

White

24.5%

0.431

Other

5.4%

0.226

Ethnicitya

a

Participants were allowed to identify as more than one ethnicity.
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Table 3.2. Double-bounded Tobit model with random effects error
INCURABLE
FATAL
CURABLE*INTERVENTION
INCURABLE*INTERVENTION
FATAL*INTERVENTION
WHITE
GENDER
PREGNANCY
ABORTION
STITEST
CONSTANT
𝜎𝜂
𝜎𝜀
𝜒2
Observations
Subjects
SE in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.

0.457
(0.322)
1.647***
(0.324)
0.974***
(0.324)
2.120***
(0.328)
3.024***
(0.332)
1.669**
(0.664)
-0.527
(0.681)
0.278
(0.591)
1.742**
(0.711)
0.105
(1.071)
5.566***
(0.741)
3.728***
(0.226)
3.113***
(0.086)
124.2
1,224
204

Table 3.3. Median WTP estimates and WTP difference
Median WTP

WTPc,0

$331.33
(115.07)

WTPc,0

$523.26
(181.63)

WTPinc,0

$1 720.72
(601.12)

WTPf ,0

$855.40
(297.59)

WTPc ,1

$2 691.73
(948.32)

WTPinc,1

$6 643.15
(2361.59)

WTPf ,1

WTPinc,0

WTPf ,0

WTPc ,1

WTPinc,1

WTPf ,1

$191.93
(215.01)a
$1 197.46**
(627.96)b
$524.07
(319.06)e
$2 168.47**
(965.56)f

$1 836.33**
(993.92)c
$4 922.43**
(2,436.90)g

$3 951.42*
(2,544.88)d

Alternative hypotheses for scope tests (one-tailed t-tests): a) WTPinc,0  WTPc,0 , b) WTPf ,0  WTPinc,0 , c) WTPinc,1  WTPc,1 , d) WTPf ,1  WTPinc,1 .
Alternative hypotheses for intervention effect (two-tailed t-tests): e)

WTPc,1  WTPc,0 , f) WTPinc,1  WTPinc,0 , g) WTPf ,1  WTPf ,0 .

SE in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 3.4. Double-Bounded Tobit Model (pre- and post-intervention)
Pre-Intervention
Post-Intervention
INCURABLE
0.438
1.218**
(0.446)
(0.541)
FATAL
1.620***
2.227***
(0.448)
(0.546)
WHITE
1.504***
2.145***
(0.436)
(0.541)
GENDER
-0.678
-0.375
(0.447)
(0.543)
PREGNANCY
-0.147
1.012**
(0.402)
(0.471)
ABORTION
0.856
2.342**
(0.765)
(1.049)
STITEST
1.080
-1.222
(0.707)
(0.846)
CONSTANT
5.874***
6.149***
(0.533)
(0.643)
4.412***
5.273***

(0.157)
(0.206)
2
32.85
44.99

Observations
612
612
Subjects
204
204
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5. Double bounded Tobit model with random effects error (estimating
treatment for each STI separately)
Curable
Incurable
Fatal
INTERVENTION
0.936**
1.691***
1.426***
(0.377)
(0.373)
(0.358)
WHITE
1.234*
1.593**
2.572***
(0.636)
(0.719)
(0.758)
GENDER
-0.220
-0.987
-0.295
(0.651)
(0.736)
(0.766)
ABORTION
0.647
1.817*
2.033*
(1.033)
(1.096)
(1.121)
PREGNANCY
0.281
0.457
0.267
(0.571)
(0.644)
(0.670)
STITEST
0.026
0.151
-0.057
(1.026)
(1.158)
(1.200)
CONSTANT
5.534***
6.314***
6.834***
(0.705)
(0.789)
(0.819)

2.691***
3.377***
3.678***
(0.308)
(0.306)
(0.308)

3.674***
3.554***
3.333***
(0.212)
(0.215)
(0.210)
2
76.15
121.7
142.3

Observations
408
408
408
Subjects
204
204
204
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 4: An Economic Analysis of Project GOAL—A Risk Reduction
Intervention for Urban Substance Using MSM

4.1

Introduction

The CDC estimates that there are 20 million new sexually transmitted infections
(STIs) each year in the United States, with the direct economic cost of treating these
infections estimated to be nearly 16 billion dollars (CDC, 2013). Moreover STIs have an
impact on a large proportion of the US population, as an estimated one in three
Americans will contract a sexually transmitted infection at some point in their lives
(Summers et al., 2002). The burden of these infections is considerably higher in in men
who have sex with men (MSM) populations, especially in regard to HIV. For instance,
while this population is estimated to represent only 2% of the US population the CDC
estimates that male-to-male sexual contact accounts for over 65% of new infections in the
United States (CDC, 2015). Additionally, the use of alcohol and drugs has been linked to
sexual risk taking behavior and higher STI incidence and prevalence (Carey et al., 2009;
Meader et al., 2013; Owusu-Edusei Jr et al., 2013). It follows that the substance-using
MSM are among the groups most at-risk for HIV infections in the United States (Carey et
al., 2009; Chesney, Barrett, & Stall, 1998; Plankey et al., 2007; Stall & Purcell, 2000).
To mitigate the burden of STIs, a number of interventions have been found to be
clinically effective in both heterosexual (Bryan et al., 2009; DiClemente et al., 2004) and
MSM populations (Kurtz et al., 2013). Additionally, research has found that substance
abuse intervention in conjunction with STI reduction strategies to be clinically valuable

77
(Mansergh et al., 2010; Shoptaw et al., 2005; Stall, Paul, Barrett, Crosby, & Bein, 1999).
However, in addition to clinical outcomes, social planners are becoming increasingly
interested in analysis from an economic perspective. As societal resources are limited,
economic analysis allows policy makers to maximize the impact of these resources (i.e.
spend money as efficiently as possible) both in terms of comparing alternative STI
reduction interventions alongside other socially beneficial programs.
From this perspective, a number of sexual risk reduction intervention programs
have been found to be valuable (Chesson, Greenberg, & Hennessy, 2002; Pinkerton,
Holtgrave, & Jemmott, 2000; Sweat, O'Donnell, & O'Donnell, 2001). However, the
economic impact of sexual risk reduction interventions is still not well-known.
Considering the large number of at-risk populations and potential intervention strategies,
only a small subset have been evaluated from an economic perspecitve. Moreover, as
more is learned about transmission dynamics and the medical cost of treating infections,
economic estimates must be updated. A specific population that deserves more attention
is the substance-using MSM population, as there is a lack of economic evaluations for
interventions designed for this population.
In this study we evaluate the economic impact of two separate interventions
delivered to substance using MSM: a brief, single-session standard-of-care intervention
based on empowerment theory, and an enhanced efficacious multiple-group-session
intervention called Project GOAL (Getting Out and Living). A previous study
investigated the clinical efficacy of both interventions (Kurtz et al., 2013). This study
extends this research to evaluate the economic impacts generated by these interventions.
Bernoulli probability models utilizing multiple STI cites and transmission dynamics for
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multiple periods are used to estimate the averted infections attributable to each
intervention which are then monetized and compared against the implementation costs.

4.2

Background

4.2.1

Economic Analysis of Interventions for Risky Sexual Behavior

To prevent STI acquisition and retransmission, a number of interventions have
been designed, which can generally be broken down into two categories, biomedical
interventions and behavioral interventions. The objective of biomedical interventions is
to screen for and treat infections in a target population. Thus, by reducing the population
prevalence, fewer infections will be acquired and retransmitted. Alternatively, the
objective of behavioral interventions is to educate individuals about safer methods to
have sex, to provide information about the costs associated with acquiring infections,
and/or increase the self-efficacy, personal control, and/or coping abilities of participants
(otherwise called empowerment). Thus, by changing the behavior of participants, fewer
infections will be acquired and retransmitted.
A number of studies have evaluated STI reduction interventions from an
economic perspective, generally finding these interventions to be beneficial. For instance,
STI interventions have been found to be cost-effective (Chesson et al., 2002; Holtgrave &
Kelly, 1996; Pinkerton, Holtgrave, et al., 2000; Sweat et al., 2001). A few studies have
found STI interventions to be valuable from a societal perspective (Dealy et al., 2013;
Wang et al., 2000). Also, a number of studies have found strategies to combat HIV cost-
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effective in developing countries (Creese, Floyd, Alban, & Guinness, 2002; Hogan,
Baltussen, Hayashi, Lauer, & Salomon, 2005).
An important difference between biomedical interventions and behavioral
interventions is that because behavioral interventions change behavior, they will affect a
larger number of STI categories (i.e. infections that are not treatable using medication).
For instance, when Dealy et al. (2013) incorporated incurable viral infections into the
economic model, the per participant averted direct medical costs increased from $250.41
to $322.33.
Behavioral interventions for risky sexual behavior have an especially high
potential for generating economic benefit among the population of substance abusing
men who have sex with men (MSM) populations. Moreover, substance abusing MSM are
among the highest risk for HIV infections in the United States. A few studies have found
positive results of behavioral interventions for risky sexual behavior in MSM
populations. For instance, Pinkerton, Holtgrave, and Valdiserri (1997) found HIVprevention skills training for MSM to provide cost-savings. Pinkerton, Holtgrave,
DiFranceisco, Stevenson, and Kelly (1998) found that the reductions in direct medical
costs attributable to a community-level risk reduction intervention in gay bars more than
offset the costs of intervention costs. Holtgrave and Kelly (1997) found that a behavioralcognitive group intervention for gay men resulted in cost-savings and Tao and Remafedi
(1998) found HIV prevention intervention for gay and bisexual male adolescents in
Minnesota to be cost-effective. Additionally, Kahn, Kegeles, Hays, and Beltzer (2001)
found a community-level intervention for young gay men to be cost-effective.
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4.3

Materials and Methods

4.3.1

Participants

Between November 2008 and October 2010, 515 participants were recruited for
the study. Men between the ages of 18 and 55 who met risky-sex and substance abuse
criteria were eligible for the study. Specifically, participants’ recent sexual history (last
90 days) must have included anal sex with multiple partners and include at least one
unprotected anal intercourse event with a non-monogamous partner. The substance abuse
criteria required that they engaged in three or more instances of binge drinking or drug
use (excluding marijuana) in the last month. Participants who used marijuana were
eligible if they used at least 20 times in the last month. Of the original 515 participants
our analysis is restricted to the participants who answered all three follow-up risky sexual
behavior questions (3, 6 and 12 months), which resulted in a final sample of 420
participants. The potential impact of this sample restriction is explored in the sensitivity
analysis.

4.3.2

Procedure

4.3.2.1 Interventions

Participants were randomized into two intervention conditions: (1) an enhanced
efficacious HIV risk-reduction counseling condition (standard-of-care) (Kamb et al.,
1998), and (2) Project GOAL, a novel small group sexual and substance use risk
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intervention based on psychological empowerment theory (Zimmerman, Rappaport, &
Seidman, 2000). More details on the interventions can be found in Kurtz et al. (2013).

4.3.2.2 Measures

A particularly advantageous aspect of this trial is the level of detail collected on
participants’ risky sexual behavior. Specifically, questions were asked about two main
types of sex acts (oral and anal), and these questions were conditioned on a number of
key variables: (1) number of partners, (2) whether the activity was with their primary
partner, (3) whether the act was insertive or receptive, and (4) whether or not a condom
was used. For instance, two specific question asked regarding non-primary partner sex
were: (1) “In the past 3 months how many times in total did you have receptive anal
sex?” and (2) “Of the men that you had receptive anal sex with, how many men was it
without a condom?” All of these questions were collected at baseline, three months, six
months, and twelve months after the intervention. Questions regarding sexual activities
covered the last 90 days. Consequently, information on sexual activities between six
months and nine months, post-intervention are not observed.

4.4

Results

4.4.1

Analysis Plan
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In this section we provide the methods used to evaluate the economic impact of
Project GOAL and the standard intervention. First, a Bernoulli probability model is used
to translate self-reported risky sexual behavior into expected STI for each intervention
group. Averted infection attributable to the intervention are calculated as the difference in
expected STI, assuming that pre-intervention behavior would be maintained in the
absence of the program. Next, these averted infections are monetized using expected
lifetime direct medical costs of STI treatment that were obtained from the literature.
Monetized economic benefits are then compared with the estimated intervention costs.
Finally, sensitivity analysis is conducted on a number of imputed prevalence and
transmission parameters, in addition to model assumptions.

4.4.1.1 Cost Estimation Procedures

Participants in both intervention conditions were provided HIV tests at the
baseline and each follow-up. It is assumed that in practice, interventions will be
conducted in a community-based organization which serves the MSM population and that
intervention staff members will be comprised of nurses, social workers, or counselors.
Training is assumed to be conducted by clinical psychologists. Overhead is assumed to
cost 25% of labor and materials.
The enhanced intervention included a single, individual session which required
one staff member and lasted approximately 30-45 minutes. Project GOAL was comprised
of four, two-hour group sessions attended by five to ten participants. The group sessions
required two staff members. In addition to the four group sessions, the enhanced
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intervention also included an hour-long individual session with a single staff member. In
addition to the time required to deliver the intervention, both interventions required that
interventionists receive training.

4.4.1.2 Bernoulli Probability Model

To link self-reported sexual behavior to STI acquisition and retransmission
probabilities a Bernoulli probability model similar to Dealy et al. (2013) and Benotsch,
Mikytuck, Ragsdale, and Pinkerton (2006) is utilized. An advantage of this methodology
is that it is able to predict both the probability that a participant will acquire an infection
(known as primary infections) and the probability that a participant will retransmit an
infection to a sexual partner (known as secondary infections).
As mentioned previously, this particular study is unique due to the amount of
information collected on participants’ sexual acts. Including this information involves a
slightly more complicated version of the Bernoulli model. The study collected
information regarding participants’ sexual acts (oral and anal), as well as the role of the
participant in each act (insertive or receptive). Overall, these acts represent contact
between participants and their partners at three separate body sites (oral/pharynx,
anal/rectal and penile/urethral). In order to effectively utilize the information collected
during the clinical trial, the Bernoulli model accounts for the participants’ sexual
activities, role, as well as variation in prevalence at each body site.
Although a participant can acquire an infection at any of three body sites, we
assume that treatment costs incurred are the same regardless of the site of the initial
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infection and the probability of requiring treatment at any site is bound between 0 and 1.
Based on participants’ reported sexual activity, we estimate the probability of STI j at
each site as
ni ,l
ki ,l mi ,l 

Pi , j  1   i , j  1   1   l , j    l , j 1  i ,l , j  1  i ,l , j 1      

 
l


(4.1)

where i represents the site-of-contact for the intervention participant, and l represents
the site-of-contact for their sexual partner ( i, l  pharyngeal, urethral, rectal ).
Prevalence is denoted as

 , where the term  l , j

is the probability that a partner is

infected with STI j at site l , and the term 1   i , j  represents the probability that a
participant is not infected with (and therefore susceptible to) STI j at corresponding siteof-contact i . The per-act transmission probability for STI j is indicated by

 i ,l , j .

Note

that the site-of-contact for the participant and their partner jointly determine the act (oral
or anal) and the role (insertive or receptive). For example, the combination of i  urethral
and l  rectal represents insertive anal sex. In terms of other model parameters, the
number of unprotected acts is denoted as ni ,l and the number of protected acts (where a
condom is used) is denoted as k i ,l .The number of sexual partners with whom a particular
act is engaged is denoted as mi ,l . Note that transmission probability is reduced by
condom efficiency,

 . Pharyngeal and rectal infections are determined by a single sex

act (receptive oral and anal sex, respectively). However, urethral infections can be
generated by insertive oral and anal sex. The probability of contracting an infection at
any site is calculated incorporating the risks of infection at each site.
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As viral infections are incurable, the probability of being susceptible to infection
in period t is affected by the exposure to risk in period t 1 . Thus, susceptibility to
infection is carried over into later periods. However, bacterial infections are treatable, and
it is possible for participants to contract an infection and then be susceptible to another
infection. Thus, we model the susceptibility of acquiring a primary infection as returning
to 1   i , j  at the start of each 3-month period.
In addition to the possibility of a sexual act causing an acquisition of a STI, if the
participant is infected a sexual act can also transmit an infection to a sexual partner. We
refer to these types of infections as secondary infections. Secondary infections are
calculated in a fashion similar to primary infections, but must be tailored to account for
their partner’s role in the act. Similar to primary infections, the probability of any single
partner acquiring an infection at any site is bound between zero and one. However, the
sum of secondary infections may exceed one, as participants may engage with multiple
partners.
nl ,i
kl ,i 

Sl , j  1   l , j  1   1   i , j    i , j 1  l ,i , j  1  l ,i , j   


i


(4.2)

The average probability of secondary infection is calculated by incorporating the average
risk at each site, and then multiplying by the number of partners. Unlike primary
infections, the risk of viral infections are not carried over periods. Although this clinical
trial collected considerable detail, it was not possible to verify whether partners in period

t were the same as those in period t 1 . Thus, it was not possible to account for partners’
previous risk.
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Two additional assumptions are generally made when estimating Bernoulli
probability models. First, it is assumed that participants are serial monogamists. That is,
all acts with a single partner take place prior to engaging in an act with a different
partner. Second, it is assumed that there exists zero overlap between participants’
partners. Both of these assumptions are evaluated in our sensitivity analysis section.

4.4.1.3 Benefit Estimation

To estimate the number of averted infections produced by each intervention, a
pre-post model is used, incorporating the change in risky sexual behavior. Specifically, a
separate Bernoulli model is calculated for both primary and secondary infections, for
each participant, time period, and STI. The aggregated difference in the predicted prepost STI incidence is the estimated reduction in STI attributable to the intervention
condition. Averted infections are monetized using inflation-adjusted cost estimates from
(Owusu-Edusei Jr et al., 2013). Details on the cost estimation calculations can be found
in the original study (H. W. Chesson et al., 2004)

4.4.1.4 Sensitivity Analysis

To evaluate the robustness of the results, sensitivity analysis is performed on the
imputed prevalence rates, transmission probabilities, and treatment costs. This approach
is similar to the methods used by Adams, Turner, and Edmunds (2007), van Valkengoed
et al. (2001), and Dealy et al. (2013). Specifically, for each of these variables, two
additional Bernoulli models are estimated, each with an imputed model parameter
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increased (or decreased). Additionally, sensitivity analysis is used to evaluate how
modelling assumptions may have influenced the findings. Specifically, assumptions
about serial monogamy, and that there is zero overlap between the partners of
intervention participants is evaluated. Additionally, we evaluate the impact of excluding
participants who failed to return for clinical trial follow-up interviews, and the
assumption of zero uptake of PrEP drugs by participants.
Recall that the Bernoulli model used in the primary analysis assumes that
participants engage in serial monogamy. That is, all acts with one partner take place
before engaging with any acts with a different partner. To evaluate the impact of this
assumption, we calculate an alternative Bernoulli model which assumes serial
promiscuity. Additionally, the primary analysis assumes that there exists zero overlap
between the partners of study participants, meaning that no intervention participant
engages in sexual activities with another intervention participant, and no participants
engage in sexual activities with the same partner outside of the intervention. Instead if
study participants engage in sexual acts with other intervention participants, or if two or
more intervention participants share at least one common partner outside of the
intervention, secondary infections may be overestimated. To evaluate the impact of this
assumption, an alternative extreme assumption would be that there exists 100% overlap,
which is equivalent to assuming that all the partners of study participants are themselves
study participants. Thus, assuming 100% overlap is equivalent to excluding all secondary
infections because these would already be calculated as primary infections.
Another potential limitation of the main Bernoulli model, is that clinical trial
recruited 515 participants, of which approximately 18.4% (n=95) of the participants
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receiving one of the intervention conditions failed to return for at least one of the clinical
trial follow-up interviews. The primary analysis excludes these individuals from the
economic benefit calculations. If attrition in the clinical trial was random, then our results
would not be biased. However, if, for example, attrition was more likely among
individuals for whom the intervention was less-effective, then the benefits calculated by
the Bernoulli model could be inflated. In order to test whether attrition in the clinical trial
is driving the economic benefits calculated in the primary analysis, an auxiliary Bernoulli
model is calculated where risky sexual behavior from missing periods is imputed using
data from other reported follow-up behavior. Specifically, this auxiliary Bernoulli model
includes all participants regardless of whether they missed a follow-up interview.
However, if a missed a follow-up interview, resulting in no data on their behaviors
reported for that time period, the participant’s baseline behaviors were imputed into the
model.
A final limitation of the standard Bernoulli model, which is particularly relevant
for risky sexual behavior interventions for MSM populations, is that economic studies
generally do not consider medication that can be used to reduce transmission probabilities
for HIV. Preexposure prophylaxis (PrEP) has been found to be a highly-effective method
for primary prevention of HIV (Smith, Herbst, & Rose, 2015). The primary analysis
assumes that there is zero uptake of PrEP in the population. However, if participants in
either Project GOAL or the enhanced intervention were taking PrEP, then it would
influence the transmission rate of HIV for these individuals. Thus, the probability of
primary and secondary HIV infections at baseline and all follow-up periods could be
inflated, and therefore, reductions in risk attributable to the interventions could be
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inflated. However, the uptake of PrEP in substance using MSM populations is largely
unknown. Thus, to evaluate the impact of potential for uptake of PrEP drugs on the
Bernoulli model results, we simulates the effect of increased PrEP uptake in the
population. Specifically, for a given percentage (from 0% to 100%) participants are
chosen randomly and then “treated” with PrEP. The HIV transmission rate for all acts for
the participants randomly “treated” with PrEP is reduced by 75.2%, an estimate by Smith
et al. (2015). Each PrEP simulation is repeated 300 times in order to minimize the
potential for idiosyncratic differences in individual participants’ behavior to influence the
results.

4.4.2

Outcome Analysis

4.4.2.1 Sample Characteristics

Sample characteristics of the 420 participants who reported to the 12-month
follow-up are shown in Table 4.1. 201 participants were randomly assigned into Project
GOAL and 231 were assigned to the enhanced intervention. The samples were very
similar in terms of age, race, sexual identity, and HIV positive status.

4.4.2.2 Program Costs

Annual and per-participant costs for the implementation of the Project GOAL and
the enhanced intervention are presented in Table 4.2. Each intervention condition is
assumed to treat 250 participants each year. During the clinical trial, the enhanced
intervention utilizes a single, individual session which required one staff member and
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lasted approximately 30-45 minutes. Here, it is assumed that each session will last for 45
minutes, requiring 187.5 hours annually. During the clinical trial, Project GOAL was
comprised of four group sessions lasting approximately two hours. Each group session
was attended by five to ten participants and required two interventionists. Additionally,
each Project GOAL participant attended an individual session lasting one hour with a
single interventionist. Here, it is assumed that each intervention group will include five
participants, and each group will require 21 hours of interventionist labor. Thus, the
annual labor required for a Project GOAL program intervention treating 250 participants
is 1,050. In addition to ongoing labor required to deliver the intervention, it is assumed
that both intervention conditions require annual training. The field staff conducting the
interventions for the clinical trials attended 20 hours. It is assumed that each intervention
condition will train two interventionists each year and the labor for the interventionist and
the trainer is included in the program implementation costs.
For both the standard, and the enhanced intervention, labor costs for
interventionists and HIV tests comprise the largest segment of costs associated with the
intervention, accounting for approximately 75% of program costs. In order to estimate the
cost of intervention implementation, a number of assumptions are made. In particular, it
is assumed that each intervention would treat. Including labor, overhead and HIV testing
costs, the enhanced intervention would cost approximately $39,126 annually, translating
to $156.50 per participant. Implementation of Project GOAL would cost approximately
$60,915 annually, translating to $239.12 per participant.

4.4.2.3 Economic Benefits
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Recall that in this study, more detailed questions about risky sexual behavior were
elicited than other economic studies utilizing the Bernoulli probability model. To utilize
this greater level of detail, prevalence rates were obtained for each STI, at each of the
three body sites at which an infection may occur (Rectal, Urethral, and Pharyngeal).
Additionally, role- and act-dependent transmission probabilities were obtained for each
STI (insertive anal, receptive anal, insertive oral and receptive oral). Transmission and
prevalence rates were selected from a number of previously published studies to best
reflect the characteristics of the intervention participants.
Table 4.3 provides the imputed prevalence rates, transmission probabilities and
direct medical treatment costs used in our analysis (Balaji et al., 2013; Beachler et al.,
2012; Bohl et al., 2011; Boily et al., 2009; Burchell, Winer, de Sanjose, & Franco, 2006;
Hooper et al., 1978; Jones & Wasserheit, 1991; Kent et al., 2005; Machalek, Grulich, Jin,
Templeton, & Poynten, 2012; Owusu-Edusei Jr et al., 2013; Platt, Rice, & Mccormack,
1983; Schiffer, Mayer, Fong, Swan, & Wald, 2014). Each transmission probability given
in Table 4.3 represents act- and role-specific, per-coital-act probability of transmission
with an infected partner. Data was not available for the transmission rates for all sexual
act and STI combinations. In these cases transmission rates were estimated using the
method suggested by Varghese, Maher, Peterman, Branson, and Steketee (2002), which
calculates relative transmission probabilities based on transmission probabilities from
known STIs.
Intervention participants’ sexual risk behaviors are summarized in Table 4.4. Note
that for both the standard intervention and the enhanced intervention, participants
reported fewer partners and acts for all sexual activities. Of particular importance is the
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reduction in the highest risk sexual activities: unprotected anal sex. Participants in both
intervention conditions reported reduced high risk sexual acts, defined as unprotected
anal intercourse.
Table 4.5 presents the reduction in risky sexual activities translate to averted
infections estimated by the Bernoulli model. Primary infections averted attributable to
Project GOAL include: 20.4 Chlamydia infections, 19.3 Gonorrhea infections, 0.59 HIV
infections, 8 HPV infections, and 14.5 HSV2 infections. Similarly, primary infections
averted amongst the enhanced intervention participants include: 22.4 Chlamydia
infections, 18.7 Gonorrhea infections, 0.03 HIV infections, 6.4 HPV infections, and 13
HSV-2 infections. Note that over time, the number of averted primary HIV infections
attributable to the enhanced intervention decreases, while the number of averted primary
HIV infections attributable to Project GOAL is increasing.
Secondary infections averted amongst the Project GOAL participants include:
273.8 Chlamydia infections, 271.3 Gonorrhea infections, 7 HIV infections, 178.2 HPV
infections and 57.6 HSV-2 infections. Secondary infections averted amongst the
enhanced intervention participants include: 317.6 Chlamydia infections, 317.1 Gonorrhea
infections, 9.3 HIV infections, 202.2 HPV infections, and 60.7 HSV-2 infections. It
should be noted that these results are generated assuming that there is zero overlap
between participants’ partners in either intervention group or even for the same
participant across time. As such, secondary infections are potentially inflated. The impact
of this assumption on the findings presented in this study is explored further in the
sensitivity analysis.
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Overall, averted infections for Project GOAL participants translate to a reduction
of over $2.5 million in expected direct medical costs (~$12k per participant). Averted
infections in the enhanced intervention group translate to a reduction of over $3 million
in expected direct medical costs (~$14.1k per participant). Note that averted secondary
infections comprise approximately 92% of the benefits generated by Project GOAL, and
over 99% of the benefits generated by the enhanced intervention condition.

4.4.2.4 Sensitivity Analysis

Sensitivity analysis results are presented in Table 4.6. Recall that the sensitivity
analysis evaluates the sensitivity of the economic impacts to imputed prevalence rates,
transmission probabilities, treatment costs, as well as model assumptions.
First, we find that in both interventions, our results are robust to changes in the
imputed model parameters. Univariate changes of the prevalence, transmission rate and
direct medical costs all produce economic benefits exceeding the implementation of the
programs. Additionally, the economic impacts are robust to multivariate changes in
imputed model parameters. Joint reductions across imputed model parameters failed to
reduce the level of economic benefits of either intervention below the cost of
implementation.
Next, we consider changes to modelling assumptions. Recall that the baseline
assumption is that there exists zero overlap of partners between participants. If this were
not the case, and some participants had common partners, then our estimates of
secondary infections would be inflated. At the extreme, there would be 100% overlap,
and each participant partner would also be an intervention participant. In this case, it
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would be appropriate to exclude secondary infections. For Project GOAL, assuming
100% overlap would reduce economic benefits to approximately $203k (~$4.24 for every
$1 spent on implementation). For the enhanced intervention, 100% overlap corresponds
to approximately $22.8k in economic benefits (~$0.67 per dollar spent on
implementation). Thus, while the economic benefits of Project GOAL are robust to
potential overlap in partners, the enhanced intervention is not. Although both of the
estimates presented in the sensitivity analysis are extreme assumptions, it is possible to
vary the level of overlap between 0% and 100%. Figure 4-1 displays the ratio of averted
direct medical costs to program implementation costs as a function of partner overlap.
The short-dash line essentially represents the break-even point for the interventions. Note
that for the enhanced intervention, the averted medical expenditures exceed
implementation costs until overlap exceeds well over 90%.
Relaxing the assumption of serial monogamy increases the ratio of averted direct
medical expenditures to implementation costs of the Project GOAL intervention (the
range is from $52.70 to $115.41). Similarly, for the enhanced intervention, relaxing the
serial monogamy assumptions increases the ratio of averted medical costs to
implementation costs (the range is $90.20-$207.52). As expected, the assumption of
serial monogamy serves as a conservative estimate of the economic benefits.
Recall that for our primary Bernoulli model, only intervention participants from
the clinical trial who show up for each follow-up are included. As attrition may not be
random, it is prudent to consider how it may influence the results. To test whether this
may be the case, individuals who failed to show up to a follow-up were included, and it is
assumed that their behavior reverts back to their behavior reported at the baseline. The
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ratio of averted direct medical costs to program implementation costs for Project GOAL
were reduced (the range is from $52.70 to $45.27). Similarly, the ratio of averted direct
medical costs to program implementation for the enhanced intervention were reduced
(the range is $90.20 to $85.38). Overall, even assuming that participants which left the
clinical trial reverted back to their pre-intervention risk levels, both interventions
produced benefits which exceeded the implementation costs.
In order to test the sensitivity of the Bernoulli model economic benefit
calculations to increased uptake of PrEP, this study simulates the effect of uptake in the
intervention participants. If 10% of the Project GOAL participants receive PrEP, averted
medical costs are approximately $2.35 million (~$50 per dollar spent on
implementation). If 50% of the Project GOAL participants receive PrEP, averted medical
costs are approximately $1.62 million (~$33.73 per dollar spent on implementation). If
10% of the enhanced intervention participants receive PrEP, averted medical attributable
to the intervention are approximately $2.86 million (~$83.74 per dollar spent on
implementation). If PrEP uptake increases to 50%, the enhanced intervention produces
$1.97 million in averted medical costs (~$57.76 per dollar spent on implementation).
Figure 4-2 illustrates the effect of PrEP uptake in the population between 1% and 100%.
Although the potential for PrEP to reduce the marginal benefit of subsequent
interventions is clear, even at 100% uptake these interventions produce averted medical
benefits that greatly exceed the cost of implementation. Thus, even in a population with
unrealistically high level of PrEP uptake, these behavioral interventions are beneficial.

96
4.5

Discussion

This study economically evaluated Project GOAL, a behavioral sexual-risk and
drug abuse intervention for MSM. Using our standard model assumptions, the Project
GOAL intervention produced approximately $12,601 in averted direct medical
expenditures per participant. The enhanced efficacy intervention slightly outperformed
Project GOAL, producing approximately $14,080 in averted direct medical expenditures.
Implementation costs for Project GOAL were approximately $239 per participant, which
translates to approximately $52.70 in averted medical expenditures per $1 spent on
implementation. The implementation costs for the standard intervention were
approximately $157 per participant, which translates to approximately $90.20 in averted
medical expenditures per $1 spent on implementation. Thus, both types of interventions
are associated substantial reductions in direct medical costs associated with STIs. Also,
both interventions were found to have considerably low program costs that avoided
medical costs. Additionally, no economic evidence is found that Project GOAL is
beneficial compared with the standard-of-care intervention. These findings contribute to
the existing literature evaluating behavioral sexual risk reductions for MSM which have
been found to be beneficial social programs (Holtgrave & Kelly, 1997; Pinkerton et al.,
1998; Pinkerton et al., 1997; Tao & Remafedi, 1998).
While the additional resources required for implementation of Project GOAL do
not appear to yield higher benefits, this could change if the study period were extended.
Averted HIV infections attributable to the enhanced intervention reduced gradually over
time, while averted infections attributable to Project GOAL increased.
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A number of methodological issues should be considered when interpreting our
results. First, the standard Bernoulli model has a number of limitations (Pinkerton &
Abramson, 1998; Pinkerton, Chesson, Holtgrave, Kassler, & Layde, 2000). In this case,
the pre-post model assumes that, in the absence of the program, participants would have
continued to exhibit sexual behavior consistent with baseline self-reported behaviors.
Also, the model utilized for this study only considered how sexual acts and role affected
transmission efficiencies. The epidemiological literature has suggested a number of
additional factors that could impact STI transmission efficiency, including age, viral load,
preexisting immunological deficiencies, and nutrition, among others (Burchell et al.,
2006).
There are additional factors to consider that are specific to the viral STIs. First,
the model does not account for the possibility that participants’ have received an HPV
vaccination. Second, it could be argued that for a highly sexually active group such as the
population studied here, averted incurable infections are not necessarily prevented, but
rather delayed. However, additional days of relatively better health are valuable.
Nonetheless, future research is needed to study the economic consequences of averted
viral infections (Kahn et al., 2001).
In summary, the Bernoulli model estimated in this paper presents short-term
evidence that both interventions are beneficial social programs. Regardless of model
parameters or assumptions the expected direct medical costs averted by participation in
the interventions more than offset the cost of the intervention.
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Table 4.1. Summary Statistics

Participants
Age
Hispanic
Race
African American, Black or Caribbean
White
Other
Percent HIV Positive
Baseline
3-Month
6-Month
12-Month
Sexual Identity
Gay
Bisexual

Standard Project GOAL
219
201
39.0
40.0
21.6%
28.9%

Total
420
39.72
24.8%

21.5%
52.1%
5.9%

18.4%
46.8%
5.5%

20.0%
49.5%
5.7%

48.4%
50.2%
50.2%
50.2%

45.3%
45.8%
46.3%
46.3%

46.9%
48.1%
48.3%
48.3%

83.1%
15.5%

82.6%
16.4%

82.9%
16.0%
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Table 4.2. Program Costs
Component

Intervention Costs
Interventionist
Hours
HIV Test
Annual Training
Interventionist
Hours
Trainer Hours
Overhead
Total Costs

Unit
Cost

Annual
Quantity
Project GOAL

Annual
Cost

Cost Per
Participant

20.21

1,050

$21,221.00

$84.88

26.00

1,000

$26,000.00

$104.00

20.21

40

$808.40

$1.29

35.14

20

$702.80
$12,182.93
$60,914.63

$1.12
$47.82
$239.12

$3,789.38
$26,000.00

$15.16
$104.00

$808.40
$702.80
$7,825.14
$39,125.72

$3.23
$2.81
$31.30
$156.50

Enhanced Standard
Intervention Costs
Interventionist
Hours
HIV Test
Annual Training
Interventionist
Hours
Trainer Hours
Overhead
Total Costs

$20.21

187.5

$26.00

1,000

$20.21

40

$35.14

20

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROJECT GOAL
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Table 4.3. Bernoulli model population parameters

STI Direct Medical
Treatment Costsm

Chlamydia

Gonorrhea

HSV-2

HPV

HIV

$31.59

$83.18

$801.27

$47.38

$320,612

0.210a
0.149a
0.364a

0.261e
0.261e
0.261e

STI population prevalence rates   
Rectal
0.535a
Urethral
0.292a
Pharyngeal
0.066a

Single sex act transmission probabilities   
Insertive Anal
0.0585i
0.0689j
i
Receptive Anal
0.4500
0.5300k
i
Insertive Oral
0.0045
0.0053j
Receptive Oral
0.0090i
0.0106k
a

0.017h
0.017h
0.017h
0.017h

0.640c
0.261c
0.280b
0.052l
0.400l
0.004l
0.008l

0.105d
0.105d
0.105d
0.00182g
0.01400g
0.00014g
0.00028g

(Kent et al., 2005). b (Beachler et al., 2012). c (Machalek et al., 2012). d (Balaji et al., 2013). e (Bohl et
al., 2011). g (Boily et al., 2009). h (Schiffer et al., 2014). i (Jones & Wasserheit, 1991)*. j (Hooper et al.,
1978)*. k (Platt et al., 1983)*. l (Burchell et al., 2006). m (Owusu-Edusei Jr et al., 2013).
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Table 4.4. Intervention participants' sexual risk behaviors
Project GOAL  n  201
Insertive Oral Sex
Partners
Acts
Receptive Oral Sex
Partners
Acts
Insertive Anal Sex
Partners
Protected Acts
Unprotected Acts
Receptive Anal Sex
Partners
Protected
Unprotected

Enhanced Intervention  n  219 
Insertive Oral Sex
Partners
Acts
Receptive Oral Sex
Partners
Acts
Insertive Anal Sex
Partners
Protected Acts
Unprotected Acts
Receptive Anal Sex
Partners
Protected
Unprotected

Baseline

3-Month

6-Month

12Month

10.85
25.61

5.72
16.24

6.44
17.11

5.63
15.83

10.48
22.80

5.94
15.18

5.18
15.63

5.39
14.49

6.74
6.96
8.79

3.09
4.05
5.55

2.76
4.59
5.78

2.65
2.78
6.03

5.33
4.06
9.37

2.93
2.95
5.37

2.30
2.76
5.07

Baseline

3-Month

6-Month

3.50
2.10
5.73
12Month

12.66
27.60

6.45
19.01

6.52
20.73

5.35
18.40

12.55
25.82

5.79
15.78

5.74
16.91

4.70
15.52

6.95
5.81
13.10

3.78
3.81
8.26

3.11
4.01
8.14

2.95
3.93
7.75

7.48
3.89
11.70

2.89
2.01
5.89

3.78
3.05
6.59

2.32
2.28
5.47

Table 4.5. Averted infections

Project GOAL Intervention (n=201)
Chlamydia
Primary
Secondary
Gonorrhea
Primary
Secondary
HIV
Primary
Secondary
HPV
Primary
Secondary
HSV2
Primary
Secondary
Total
Enhanced Intervention (n=219)
Chlamydia
Primary
Secondary
Gonorrhea
Primary
Secondary
HIV
Primary
Secondary
HPV
Primary
Secondary
HSV2
Primary
Secondary
Total

Total Averted
(Monetized)

Average Averted
(Monetized)

3-Month

6-Month

12-Month

Total

6.0
83.4
5.8
82.8
0.13
2.3
3.4
53.9
6.3
17.5

6.7
93.6
6.5
92.5
0.29
2.4
5.3
61.1
10.9
20.7

7.8
96.9
7.1
96.0
0.59
2.3
8.0
63.1
14.5
19.3

20.4
273.8
19.3
271.3
0.59
7.0
8.0
178.2
14.5
57.6

$646
$8,651
$1,608
$22,566
$189,674
$2,243,142
$377
$8,442
$11,644
$46,124
$2,532,874

$3
$43
$8
$112
$944
$11,160
$2
$42
$58
$229
$12,601

8.7
102.9
7.3
102.8
0.13
2.8
4.6
65.9
7.1
20.2

7.0
92.7
5.6
92.9
0.10
2.8
6.2
58.8
10.5
17.4

6.8
122.0
5.8
121.5
0.03
3.6
6.4
77.6
13.0
23.1

22.4
317.6
18.7
317.1
0.03
9.3
6.4
202.2
13.0
60.7

$709
$10,034
$1,559
$26,379
$9,766
$2,966,208
$303
$9,583
$10,441
$48,617
$3,083,597

$3
$46
$7
$120
$45
$13,544
$1
$44
$48
$222
$14,080
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Table 4.6. Sensitivity Analysis
Averted Medical

Averted Medical
Intervention Costs

Enhanced Intervention

Project GOAL

Enhanced Intervention

Project Goal

Chlamydia
Gonorrhea
HIV
HPV
HSV-2
All STIs

$8,228-$7,593
$15,899-$36,119
$1,580,096-$41,91,084
$9,143-$2,496
$37,684-$70,628
$1,651,049-$4,307,919

$7,092-$6,705
$13,769-$31,239
$1,295,510-$3,418,116
$7,991-$2,778
$36,596-$69,043
$1360959-$3,527,881

$90.13-$90.11
$89.85-$90.44
$49.37-$125.75
$90.18-$89.98
$89.58-$90.54
$48.3-$126.01

$52.65-$52.64
$52.48-$52.85
$29.04-$73.2
$52.68-$52.57
$52.26-$52.93
$28.32-$73.4

Chlamydia
Gonorrhea
HIV
HPV
HSV-2
All STIs

$5,854-$14,994
$15,310-$38,694
$1,523,450-$4,391,169
$5,354-$13,900
$32,012-$84,665
$1,581,979-$4,543,424

$5,083-$12,914
$13,292-$33,361
$1,236,755-$3,601,143
$4,809-$12,297
$32,047-$81,013
$1,291,984-$3,740,728

$90.06-$90.33
$89.83-$90.52
$47.71-$131.6
$90.07-$90.32
$89.41-$90.95
$46.28-$132.9

$52.61-$52.77
$52.47-$52.89
$27.81-$77.01
$52.62-$52.77
$52.16-$53.18
$26.88-$77.83

Chlamydia
Gonorrhea
HIV
HPV
HSV-2
All STIs

$5,371-$16,114
$13,969-$41,907
$1,487,987-$4,463,961
$4,943-$14,828
$29,529-$88,586
$1,541,799-$4,625,396

$4,648-$13,945
$12,087-$36,260
$1,216,408-$3,649,225
$4,410-$13,229
$28,884-$86,652
$1,266,437-$3,799,311

$90.04-$90.36
$89.79-$90.61
$46.67-$133.73
$90.06-$90.35
$89.34-$91.06
$45.1-$135.3

$52.6-$52.8
$52.45-$52.95
$27.39-$78.01
$52.61-$52.79
$52.1-$53.3
$26.35-$79.05

$22,778-$3,083,597
$3,083,597-$7,094,187
$3,083,597-$3,505,242
$2,862,683-$1,974,727

$203,949-$2,532,874
$2,532,874-$5,519,595
$2,532,874-$2,727,673
$2,354,349-$1,621,061

$0.67-$90.20
$90.20-$207.52
$90.2-$85.38
$83.74-$57.76

$4.24-$52.70
$52.70-$115.41
$52.70-$45.27
$48.98-$33.73

Prevalence  0.5  1.5 

Transmission Probability  0.5  1.5 

Medical Costs  50%  150% 

Model Assumptions
Overlap Parameter
Serial Monogamy
Intervention Attrition
PrEP Uptake (10% to 50%)
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Figure 4-1. Overlapping Partners
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Figure 4-2. PrEP Uptake
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Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks

5.1

Dissertation Summaries

This dissertation uses a variety of methods to investigate the costs and
consequences associated with risky health behaviors. Each study presented in this
dissertation utilizes a different methodology to quantify and monetize consequences
associated with risky health behaviors. Of greater interest, perhaps, is how the results of
these studies can help to better-understand interventions designed to prevent or mitigate
the impacts of risky health behaviors.
Chapter 2 utilizes a hedonic home price model to quantify the negative externality
of clandestine lab discovery as well as the positive externality of decontamination. This
work can help to better-understand the value of meth lab prevention and remediation.
Given the steep cost associated with decontamination (not to mention the administrative
costs associated with overseeing meth lab decontamination), this information could be
utilized in future cost benefit analyses evaluating mandatory meth lab decontamination.
While it seems clear that future occupants of the dwellings used to produce meth are
likely to benefit from compulsory decontamination, the findings from Chapter 2 suggest
that the benefits associated with decontamination may extend to a number of households
in the surrounding area.
Additional work building on the findings presented in chapter 2 could evaluate the
impact of meth lab discovery and decontamination in other areas. The social and spatial
characteristics of Linn County, Oregon are not representative of the US as a whole.
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Future work could focus on urban areas with more diverse population. The benefits of
other meth lab policies may also be better-understood using a similar approach. For
example, the restrictions placed on meth precursors vary across states. Furthermore, the
states which place the greatest restrictions on precursors have reduced meth lab incidence
and scale considerably. Theoretically, both of these impacts could be reflected in home
prices. Heterogeneous meth precursor restrictions across states may provide a natural
experiment in which to study this impact.
The study presented in Chapter 3 utilizes a contingent valuation survey designed
to estimate the nonmarket value of STI avoidance. However, the most important
discovery from Chapter 3 is that scope sensitivity increased following the intervention.
Scope tests are typically used to evaluate the construct validity of a specific survey
instrument. In this context, economic rationality is the construct upon which the validity
of the survey is evaluated. The increased sensitivity to scope demonstrated by the MARS
participants following the intervention suggests that the intervention itself may cause
individuals to value STI avoidance in a more rational manner.
The results of the scope tests conducted in Chapter 3 suggest that future work
estimating the nonmarket value of STI avoidance could be beneficial to work evaluating
the social benefits of similar behavioral interventions. While the unique population
evaluated in Chapter 3 may limit the generalizability of the point-estimates from this
study, future work utilizing alternative populations could estimate WTP to avoid STIs
which may be generalizable to the wider population.
The findings from Chapter 3 also motivate future work reconciling differences in
theoretical constructs utilized by psychologists and economists. Specifically, WTP and

108
the constructs of the Theory of Planned Behavior. Chapter 3 provides evidence that
elicited WTP to avoid STIs is: 1) consistent with economic theory, and; 2) affected by the
theory-based MARS intervention. The MARS intervention is based on the Theory of
Planned Behavior. Previous work has studied the relationship between WTP and the
constructs of the Theory of Planned Behavior, finding mixed results (Kahneman & Ritov,
1994; Ryan & Spash, 2011). However, this relationship has not been evaluated in the
context of a risky health behavior intervention such as Project MARS, where the
intervention is designed to affect TPB constructs.
Chapter 4 uses a Bernoulli probability model to evaluate the economic impact of
two behavioral risky-sex interventions. Both interventions generate cost-savings across
all reasonable model assumptions. Economic evaluations, such as those presented in
Chapter 4 are crucial to identifying efficacious and cost-effective interventions which
have the potential to improve health and reduce public health expenditures
simultaneously. These interventions are often optimized for efficacy in specific
populations which face unique transmission and epidemiological risks. The economic
impacts of these interventions will be sensitive to variation in these risks. Thus, in order
to justify wide-spread adoption of interventions such as those discussed in Chapter 4
requires robust sensitivity analysis. This work has inspired a number of additional
research questions. First, the averted infections calculated by the Bernoulli model
presented in Chapter 4 were monetized using medical treatment costs. However, as
discussed in Chapter 3, the benefits of the intervention may extend beyond the direct
medical costs associated with treatment of STIs. A logical extension of the work
presented in Chapter 4 would include the nonmarket value of STI avoidance. Future work
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could combine the approaches from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, using a Bernoulli model to
estimate averted infections and then monetizing averted infections using elicited WTP.
Another research question would include the emerging threat of the Zika virus. While the
epidemiological details of sexual transmission of the Zika virus are still being researched,
once contracted, the virus poses a serious threat to fetuses and adults with compromised
immune systems (e.g., individuals with HIV/AIDS). Future work could incorporate the
risk of Zika, as it represents not only a consequence of risky sexual behavior, but also has
an impact on the costs of associated with risky sex consequences.
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